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NATURE OF THE CASE 
The action was commenced by appellees Ong International 
(U.S.A.) Inc., D&D Management and David L. Alldredge (collectively 
Ong International) against appellants 11th Avenue Corporation, 
f/k/a Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum, and Keith Garner (the Garner 
appellants) to rescind as fraudulently induced two agreements 
entered in connection with a partnership between and among the 
parties. 
The jury returned a unanimous fraud verdict for Ong Interna-
tional, awarding it restitutionary and punitive damages in addition 
to finding that the agreements should be rescinded. The Garner 
appellants take this appeal from the final judgment of the District 
Court dated September 26, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Garner's statement of the issues is imprecise, and incomplete 
in light of their failure to marshal. Thus, Ong International 
reframes the issues appealed and adds the marshaling question. 
ISSUE NO. 1: 
WHETHER THE APPELLANTS1 CHALLENGE TO THE FRAUD AND 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES VERDICT MUST BE REJECTED—ON THE GROUND 
THAT THEY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE 
VERDICT AND PRESENT IT IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
VERDICT. 
ISSUE #l(a); 
WHETHER, IN ANY EVENT, THE VERDICT OF THE JURY OF FRAUD 
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE UNDER 
A CLEAR AND CONVINCING TEST. 
1 
Standard of Review: 
Under Crookston v. Fire Ins, Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789, 804 (Utah 
1991) , the trial court has broad discretion to deny a Utah R. Civ. 
P. 59 motion for new trial. 
Findings underlying the judgment will not be disturbed "unless 
evidence on the issue 'so clearly preponderates in favor of the 
appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the outcome of 
the case.1" Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, 789 P.2d 34, 35 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Daltonr 745 
P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987)). This Court may not overturn any 
verdict that is supported by "substantial and competent" evidence. 
W. Fiberglass, 789 P.2d at 35. 
ISSUE # 2: 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
GENERAL RELEASE CONTAINED IN THE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED 
REDEMPTION AGREEMENT DID NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, ALLOW 
THE GARNER APPELLANTS TO ESCAPE LIABILITY FOR FRAUD 
CLAIMS KNOWN TO THEM BUT CONCEALED FROM THEIR PARTNER AND 
FIDUCIARY, ONG INTERNATIONAL—PARTICULARLY WHEN THE 
PARTIES NEVER DISCUSSED THE RELEASE OF SUCH FRAUD AND ONG 
INTERNATIONAL DID NOT INTEND TO WAIVE FRAUD CLAIMS. 
Standard of Review: 
The clearly erroneous standard of review applies to factual 
findings regarding intent that are implicit in a verdict. Cf. 
Sorouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 221-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); W^ 
Fiberglass, 789 P.2d at 35. 
ISSUE # 3; 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF 
GARNER'S WEALTH AT THE TRIAL ON LIABILITY, BECAUSE UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (REQUIRING FINDING OF LIABILITY FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES BEFORE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF WEALTH) 
DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO THIS ACTION. 
0 
ISSUE # 3(a) : 
A RELATED ISSUE IS WHETHER THE APPELLANTS WAIVED THE 
RIGHT TO APPEAL THE APPLICATION OF § 78-18-1 BY EXPRESSLY 
STIPULATING AT TRIAL THAT THE STATUTE WOULD NOT APPLY TO 
THIS ACTION. 
Standard of Review: 
The question whether a statute applies retroactively is one of 
law that will be reviewed for correctness. Docutel Olivetti Corp. 
v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 478-79 (Utah 1986). 
ISSUE # 4: 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD WAS PROPER ON THE GROUNDS THAT, 
UNDER CROOKSTON, THE AWARD IS REASONABLY RELATED TO THE 
FRAUD COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER A RATIO OF 1/2 to 1. 
Standard of Review: 
If the ratio of punitive to actual damages should fall within 
the range this Court has consistently upheld, the trial court may 
assume the award is not excessive and may deny a new trial without 
explanation. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 807-11. The appellate court 
will review the district court's new trial ruling rather than the 
jury's verdict directly. Id. at 813. The district court's 
decision to deny a new trial on the relationship of damages ground 
must be reasonable in light of the law and the facts. Id. at 806. 
ISSUE # 5: 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
MAKING ANY EVIDENTIARY RULING THAT AMOUNTED TO FUNDAMEN-
TAL, REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Standard of Review: 
A trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence will 
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion affecting a party's 
substantial rights. Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P. 2d 
1323, 1325 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) "A substantial right of a party is 
affected if, viewing the evidence as a whole, there is reasonable 
likelihood a different result would have been reached absent the 
error." Id. 
ISSUE # 6: 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT MANIFESTLY ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
TION IN ITS AWARD OP UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(d) COSTS TO ONG 
INTERNATIONAL FOR FILING FEES, WITNESS FEES AND DEPOSI-
TION FEES. 
Standard of Review: 
The district court's award of costs is presumed correct absent 
a clear abuse of discretion. Lloyd's Unlimited and Nature's Way 
Marketing, Ltd,, 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah Ct. App, 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Ong International asserts there is no determinative statute 
for two reasons: first, because Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(2) (1992) 
does not apply retroactively to this action, and second, by their 
stipulation, the appellants have waived application of that 
statute. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Ong International concurs with the appellants' statement of 
the case with certain exceptions—the first of them glaring. The 
appellants state that the district court incorporated the entire 
special verdict into the final judgment. That is fundamentally 
false. To avoid duplication of damages, Ong International 
voluntarily withdrew from the final judgment the following parts of 
the jury verdict: (1) under interrogatory IV.A.1~$447,034.00 
awarded against Garner individually for fraud damages; (2) under 
interrogatory V.l.—$70,000.00 awarded against SLMM/llth Avenue for 
breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) under interrogatory V.2.— 
$512,000,00 awarded against Garner for conversion of assets, (R. 
5:01923-28) 
Second, by timely notice of August 4, 1991, Ong International 
elected against SLMM/llth Avenue the remedy of rescission. (R. 
3:1208-11) As to Garner, the appellants stipulated that any damage 
award would be equally applicable to Garner and SLMM/llth Avenue. 
Third, in its Memorandum Decision, dated November 13, 1991, 
the district court denied the Garner appellants1 motions for 
judgment n.o.v. or for new trial based on the reasons set out in 
Ong International's opposing memoranda. (R. 6:2532-38) The court 
also enunciated its reasons for not disturbing the punitive damage 
award, after acknowledging that such enunciation was not necessary, 
because the award bore a reasonable and rational relationship to 
actual damages under this Court's guidelines in Crookston, 817 P. 2d 
at 807-13. (R. 6:2534). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS SUPPORTING THE VERDICT 
The appellants have failed totally to meet the requirements of 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) and controlling case law that their brief 
marshal the complete facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review and to state them in a light most favorable to the verdict. 
Therefore Ong International sets out the facts and evidence which 
are material to the review and which support the jury's unanimous 
fraud verdict. 
1. Alldredae Develops Trust in Garner, 
The mortar of the fraud in this case was first mixed in 1965 
when David Alldredge first met Keith Garner. Alldredge was a young 
member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the 
L.D.S. Church) serving in Hong Kong as a proselyting missionary 
from 1963 through 1965. (Tr. 1:2927-28) Garner was the president 
of the Hong Kong mission for the last leg of Alldredgefs mission. 
(Tr. 1:2930) While serving as Garner's assistant, Alldredge 
developed a close relationship with him, and lived in the mission 
home with Garner and his family. Id. 
Through Garner, Alldredge became acquainted with Elder Marion 
D. Hanks, an L.D.S. general authority who presided over the region 
encompassing Hong Kong. (Tr. 1:2932-34) Alldredge considered it 
"thrilling" to be able to interact with Elder Hanks, and developed 
great respect for the person and his position (Tr. 1:2934-35), 
Hanks being a "man of integrity" who was "chosen by leaders of the 
church to serve [his] mission." (Tr. 1:2935) 
After returning from his mission and completing his education, 
in approximately 1971, Alldredge was employed by First National 
Bank of Chicago as a commercial banking officer. (Tr. 1:2937) His 
position required him to live and travel extensively in Asia. Id. 
In 1985 he joined the International Bank of Asia in Hong Kong as 
the general manager responsible for commercial banking activities. 
(Tr. 1:2938) 
2. The Garner Appellants' Contractor Knows Nothing About Building 
Mausolea, and Misrepresents the Crypt Construction to Govern-
mental Agencies, 
For the past thirty years, Garner has been a commercial and 
residential land developer principally in California. (Tr. V:3644-
46) In 1975 Garner moved from California to Utah and began 
developing in the state. (Tr. V:3648) For Garner's Utah projects 
he used Robert Ord exclusively as the contractor and Arnold 
Fluckiger principally as the architect (Tr. V:3648), both of whom 
are longtime friends of Garner (Tr. 111:3353-59; IV3497-99). 
In 1979 Garner purchased and took control of the Salt Lake 
Memorial Mausoleum (SLMM) from Coy Miles (Tr. V:3349), which is 
located at 1001 11th Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. IX:4582) 
The Mausoleum consists of one main building that was constructed in 
the 1920s and contains crypts for the entombment of caskets, all of 
which are located indoors and constructed entirely of poured-in-
place concrete. (Tr. 1:2881-82; IV:3612) 
In 1984 Garner retained Fluckiger to draw plans for an outdoor 
mausoleum pavilion, consisting of five structures called "pods," 
designed to house 102 crypts each. (Tr. 111:3366-67) The crypts 
are located on three walls of a pod with the fourth wall constitut-
ing the open-air entrance to the pod. (Exh. 110) 
Fluckiger had known Garner through the L.D.S. Church since 
1955 and had worked on several projects for him. (Tr. 111:3353) 
Garner had previously retained Fluckiger to design a new wing of 
concrete crypts for the indoor mausoleum, which project never 
materialized. (Tr. 111:3362, 66) The outdoor pavilion drawings, 
plans and cost estimates Fluckiger submitted to Garner expressly 
stated and envisioned the use of concrete crypts. (Tr. 111:3360-
65) 
On April 30, 1984, Fluckiger requested a zoning variance from 
the Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment to construct the outdoor 
pavilion consisting of five pods of concrete crypts containing 102 
crypts per pod or a total of 510 crypts. (Tr. IV: 3508, 3484) The 
drawings Fluckiger submitted with the request contained the 
notation "CONC crypts." (Tr. 111:3393; Exh. 50) "CONC" stands for 
7 
concrete. Id. Attached to the variance request was a commercial 
brochure advertising, depicting and describing high quality pre-
cast concrete crypts. (Tr. Ill: 3378-79, 82; Exh. 45) The 
drawings also contained the notation, "PVC 3," which indicated a 
type of pipe used for ventilation. (Tr. 111:3 394-95) Fluckiger 
drew the plans requiring concrete and a ventilation system. (Tr. 
111:3395) The estimated cost per pre-cast concrete crypt was 
$750.00. (Tr. 111:3398) 
Two months later, on July 10, 1984, the Salt Lake City 
Building Department issued the permit based on Fluckiger's 
submitted documents and building plans showing pre-cast concrete 
crypts. (Tr. IV:3477, 79, 84) 
Appellants began building the outdoor pavilion around August 
1984, but did not complete it until sometime in 1987. (Tr. 
VII:4445-46) Without giving a reason, Garner (Tr. IV:3526-27, 30) 
told Ord to depart from the architect's plan for concrete crypts 
and to use wood. (Tr. IV: 3518-19) Ord did so at Garner's express 
instructions. (Tr. IV:3518) Ord had never designed a wooden 
crypt. (Tr. IV:3528) He knew nothing and consulted no one (Tr. 
IV:3528) about mausoleum crypt construction, wood selection or wood 
treatment. (Tr. IV:3526, 30) 
With Garner's knowledge, Ord drew his own new plans for wood 
crypts. (Tr. IV:3528) The crypts were built without a drainage 
system (Tr. IV:3539), which was absolutely contrary to health and 
industry standards (IV:3540-41). Fluckiger never knew his concrete 
crypt design was altered. (Tr. 111:3361) 
Ord never notified the relevant public officials that he had 
changed the plans for the crypts from concrete to wood. (Tr. 
a 
IV:3511) He later destroyed all his records related to the cryptsf 
including building plans, specifications, cost estimates, inspec-
tion reports and financial accounts. (Tr. IV:3515) 
Ord had been with Garner since the 1950s and testified, "He is 
the best friend I have." (Tr. IV:3498-99) 
3. Salt Lake City Revokes The Building Permit. 
The City building inspector, Richard H. Ith, inspected the 
outdoor pavilion construction approximately eight times. (Tr. IV: 
3485) On January 9, 1987, the building permit was revoked and 
voided (Tr. IV: 3485-86) , due in part to the fact that the Mausoleum 
had not received Board of Health approval for the construction and 
use of wooden crypts (Tr. IV:3490). To the date of trial, Salt 
Lake City had not issued a certificate of occupancy or a- final 
building inspection certificate for the outdoor pavilion. (Tr. 
IV:3486) 
4. Garner's Motive for Constructing Wood Versus Concrete Crypts 
Is Clear — A Savings of Over $400,000. 
The trial testimony was that by constructing the wood crates 
rather than the planned concrete crypts for the outdoor pavilion, 
Garner achieved a considerable cost reduction. Garner acknowledged 
that the cost of wood construction was less. (Tr. V:3695-98) The 
unrebutted testimony was that Garner saved $409,100.00 by changing 
from the originally planned concrete crypts to plywood and 
chipboard. (Tr. VII: 4163-70; Exh. 89a) (See Attachment 1) The 
construction period of the outdoor crypts coincided with a period 
from 1982 through 1988 during which the Mausoleum lost over 
$450,000 from its operations. (Tr. V:3698) 
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5. The Missionary Acquaintance of Garner and Alldredqe is Renewed 
in 1986, 
In November 1986 Alldredge renewed his relationship with 
Garner at a B.Y.U. football game (Tr. 1:2939-40), Garner being in 
the company of Elder Hanks in the VIP box (Tr. 1:2940). 
Garner told Alldredge about his construction projects, 
including the first high rise apartment complex in Palo Alto, 
California, (Tr. 1:2941) Garner said he had "made a lot of 
money." Id. He also related his post-mission L.D.S. Church 
positions, such as regional representative and president of Temple 
Square in Salt Lake City, and said he was the best of friends with 
"Duff" Hanks. Id. The fact Garner had been called to those high 
church positions "only increased [Alldredgefs] esteem for him and 
[his] belief in [Garner's] integrity." Id. 
After learning Alldredge was a Hong Kong banker, Garner asked 
him if he could find an Asian investor for Garner's real property 
(Roundhouse) project in Arizona. (Tr. 1:2940, 43) Upon returning 
to Hong Kong in November 1986, Alldredge talked to a prominent bank 
customer, Ong Ka Tai of Ong and Company, Ltd. of Hong Kong about 
Garner, his success and the Roundhouse project. (Tr. I:2943A-45) 
Alldredge told Ong he had great respect for Garner (Tr. V:3802), 
and Ong became interested in meeting him (Tr. 1:2946), because Ong 
was "working on the assumption that the potential partner" was "an 
experienced contractor," a "successful developer" and a person of 
good "moral and ethical conviction" (Tr. V:3816). 
In negotiations, Garner told Ong he was very active in the 
L.D.S. Church and was of unquestioned integrity as evidenced by the 
i n 
secular and ecclesiastical "experience" resumes Garner sent to Ong. 
(Tr. V:3816-17) (See Attachment 2). 
6. Ong and Alldredge Meet Garner in Salt Lake City to Discuss the 
Roundhouse Project. 
In March 1987, Garner made Ong International a written 
proposal (Tr. 1:2947) to which Ong responded by traveling with 
Alldredge to meet Garner in Arizona for an inspection of Round-
house. (Tr. 1:2948; V:3802) Alldredge was working on his bank's 
behalf, and personally received no fee for his efforts related to 
the Roundhouse project. (Tr. 1:2948-49) Garner stood them up in 
Arizona, so Ong and Alldredge continued their planned trip to Salt 
Lake City, where Garner wanted to show them his "home base." (Tr. 
1:73:2950) It was Ong's first trip to Utah. (Tr. 1:2952) 
From the balcony of Garner's home located at 1200 North 1100 
East, Salt Lake City, he showed Ong and Alldredge a "fantastic" 
view of Salt Lake Valley, including the Mausoleum which was not far 
away. (Tr. 1:2953) The three continued the Roundhouse discus-
sions, discussed religion and toured Garner's posh home, complete 
with an elevator and an Olympic-size swimming pool. (Tr. 11:2973) 
After 4-6 hours chez Garner, Ong and Alldredge flew back to Hong 
Kong, but not before Garner took them on a quick spin past the 
homes of L.D.S. officials Elder Hanks and President Gordon B. 
Hinckley—which Garner built. (Tr. 1:2962; 11:2974) 
A short time later Alldredge received a letter from Garner 
quoting scripture (Tr. 11:2981) and stating that he specialized in 
"visions." (Tr. 11:2930). See Exh. 23. Garner said he believed 
the parties had "concluded a mutually acceptable vision with 
qualified and realistic dreams for the future." Id. 
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7. Ong International Enters the Roundhouse Agreement with Garner, 
In July 1987 Ong entered an agreement with Garner concerning 
the Roundhouse property• (Tr. 11:2983) (The Roundhouse deal 
subsequently turned out to be a failure, and Ong International got 
out of it. (Tr, V:3827)) Garner did not mention investment in the 
Mausoleum until November 1987, when he called Alldredge in Hong 
Kong to see whether Ong would be interested. (Tr. 11:2984; V:3808) 
8. Garner Approaches Ong International about Investing in the 
Mausoleum. 
By letter dated November 3, 1987, Garner formally invited Ong 
to invest in the Mausoleum, stating that Elder Hanks owned 2 5% of 
the Mausoleum stock, but would sell it to Ong. (Tr. 11:2986) 
Garner proposed that Ong invest $700,000 to acquire 50% of the 
Mausoleum—an amount that would purchase Hank's stock and pay off 
Mausoleum debts. (Tr. 11:2989) Garner also promised Ong and 
Alldredge "skyview" vacant residential lots adjacent to the 
Mausoleum, on which he would build them homes at cost. (Tr. 
11:2987) Since Ong International was looking for an investment in 
the United States, Ong was willing to explore the Mausoleum 
proposal. (Tr. V:3811) 
9. Garner Makes his Pitch. 
In December 1987 Alldredge, still representing his bank, 
returned to Salt Lake to view the Mausoleum for client investment 
potential. (Tr. 11:2990, 93-94) Garner showed Alldredge through 
the indoor Mausoleum, focusing on the model crypt and stating that, 
in addition to the qualities of drainage and permanency, it was 
"waterproof," "fireproof," "earthquake proof" and "sealed tightly." 
(Tr. 11:2997) 
12 
When Garner took Alldredge out to the pavilion, they did not 
walk inside the individual pods; instead they looked at them 
through the iron gate. (Tr. 11:2998) Alldredge testified Garner 
told him the outdoor crypts were the same as the model crypt—"made 
of solid concrete" and were "fireproof." (Tr. 11:2998, 3001) Upon 
returning to Hong Kong, Alldredge related to Ong and the Ong 
International Board of Directors all that Garner had represented 
about the Mausoleum and crypts. (Tr. 11:3003-06) 
In March 1988 Garner and his secretary, Susan Stewart, 
traveled to Hong Kong and Singapore to discuss Ong International's 
investment in the Mausoleum. (Tr. V:3814; Tr. IX:4631-32, 40) 
One month later, in April 1988, Ong and his wife flew to Salt 
Lake and received a tour of the Mausoleum, a high point of which 
was the indoor model concrete crypt together with all the usual 
representations that the crypt had adequate drainage and ventila-
tion and was fireproof, earthquake proof, etc. Garner also took 
the Ongs on the celebrity crypt run past the crypts allegedly owned 
by Marion Hanks et ux., the Osmonds, and "the personal dentist of 
the number one man in the L.D.S. Church." (Tr. V:3821-22) 
Garner told the Ongs the outdoor crypts were of the same 
standards as the model crypt—earthquake proof, fireproof and 
waterproof—a good project for the next two hundred years of Ong's 
posterity. (Tr. V:3823-24) Garner did not mention the fact there 
was wood in the outdoor crypts. (Tr. V:3825) 
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10• Garner's Elder Hanks Stories were Deceptions Intended to 
Induce Oner International's Infusion of Capital to Pay Off 
Mausoleum Debts and to Persuade the Believing Public to Buy 
Wood Crypts. 
Elder Hanks testified at trial that he had never owned stock 
or an interest in the Mausoleum and was never involved in its 
operations, (Tr. V:3738, 40-41, 45) He was not aware that Garner 
had listed him in any written documents as owning Mausoleum stock. 
(Tr- V:3741) Elder Hanks had lent $75,000.00 to a friend Coy 
Miles, the previous mausoleum owner, and Miles had insisted that 
Hanks hold a paper evidencing Miles1 share in the corporation (the 
two pushed the paper back and forth over Hanks1 desk). (Tr. 
V: 3738-39) The Miles loan was paid off by the funds Garner 
received from Ong International's later capital investment. (Tr. 
V.3745-47) 
Elder Hanks had not authorized anyone, including Garner, to 
use his name in promoting the sale of Mausoleum crypts or the 
Mausoleum itself. (Tr. V:3741-42, 45) Hanks testified it would be 
a "disappointing surprise" if his name were so used. (Tr. V:3741) 
Neither Elder Hanks nor his wife had ever owned a crypt at the 
Mausoleum, and had never committed themselves to owning one. (Tr. 
V:3742) In October 1988, without Hanks1 having requested or 
anticipated it, the Mausoleum sent him a gift certificate for 
two crypts. (Tr. V:3742-43) Out of courtesy Hanks did not return 
the certificate, since his wife and he had no intention to be 
interred in the Mausoleum, but rather, fully intend to be buried in 
their own plot at the City Cemetery. (Tr. V:3752) 
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11. The Joint Venturers Enter a Partnership Agreement, 
In reliance upon the representations of Garner as to the 
Mausoleum and the nature and construction of the outdoor pavilion, 
the parties entered into a partnership agreement to own and operate 
the Mausoleum evidenced by a document entitled "Salt Lake Memorial 
Mausoleum General Partnership Agreement." (Tr. 11:3014) Ong 
International paid $800,000 in cash for a fifty percent (50%) 
interest in the partnership. (Tr. VI:3878; 11:3014; 111:3232) The 
$800,000 cash infusion permitted Garner to repay a note payable to 
Tracy Collins Bank in an amount in excess of $487,000.00. (Tr. 
V:3698-99; Exh. 28) The partnership included D&D Management, Mr. 
Alldredge's management corporation. (Tr. VI:3878 and Exh. 28) The 
partnership assigned D&D Management the specific responsibility to 
manage the Mausoleum. 
In the summer of 1988, Alldredge resigned his banking position 
and moved his family to Salt Lake City so he could manage the 
Mausoleum. (Tr. 1:2926; 11:3026) Garner, however, refused to 
relinquish control and management of the Mausoleum to Alldredge. 
(Tr. 11:3035) Contrary to the terms of the partnership, Garner 
refused.to allow Alldredge to make decisions or write checks and 
denied Alldredge access to partnership records. (Tr. 11:3035, 42) 
Alldredge was not consulted on anything.1 (Tr. 11:3 042) 
12. Ong International Buys out Garner's Partnership Interest. 
The partners ultimately agreed to terminate the partnership by 
entering a partnership redemption agreement, dated February 28, 
!The situation hit such a nadir that, more than once, Garner's secretary, 
Ms. Stewart, sat Alldredge down to tell him Garner had never had a partner and 
if Alldredge did not quit acting like one, she would ship him back to Hong Kong, 
in Alldredge's words, "just like that." (Tr. 11:3036) 
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1989, and signed in March 1989, (Tr. 11:3049). Under the terms of 
the redemption agreement, SLMM transferred to Ong International all 
its remaining interest in the Mausoleum for $400,000. (Tr. 
11:3050) SLMM then changed its name to "11th Avenue Corporation." 
(Tr. IX:4582) 
13. Ong International Did Not Intend That the General Release in 
the Redemption Agreement Release Undisclosed Fraud Claims. 
At no time leading up to the redemption agreement did Garner 
or anyone else for that matter, make any statements to Ong or 
Alldredge regarding the wood construction of the outdoor crypts. 
(Tr. 11:3050, 51) Consequently neither Ong International nor D&D 
Management had any reason to suspect the construction of the 
outdoor crypts was anything less than the indoor concrete crypts, 
that Garner represented. (Tr. 11:3059) 
Had Ong International known of the crypts' shoddy construc-
tion, it would have never signed the redemption agreement. (Tr. 
V:3829-30) Indeed, Ong International would have never become 
involved in the partnership initially, "not to mention in-
crease [ing] [its] stake" in the venture. (Tr. V:3830) 
Ong International and D&D Management did not intend to release 
anyone or any entity from fraudulent omissions or misrepresenta-
tions of material facts such as the construction of the outdoor 
crypts. (Tr. 11:3059) Incident to signing the redemption 
agreement, neither the parties nor their counsel discussed the 
release of undisclosed fraud claims. (Tr. VIII:4485-90) 
14. Garner Leaves the Mausoleum Permanently. 
After entering the redemption agreement, Garner packed up and 
moved off the Mausoleum property. The morning after Garner's exit, 
April 3, 1989, Alldredge found the Partnership computer sitting on 
the office floor with all accounting and bookkeeping records erased 
from the hard drives and no software to be seen. (Tr. 11:3 092) 
Alldredge was required to hire a professional accounting firm to 
reconstruct the records from an earlier balance sheet and some 
financial statements. (Tr. 11:3093) 
15• Alldredge Discovers the Crypts are Wood. 
In May 1990 Alldredge began listing Mausoleum needs and 
leftover Garner problems in preparation for seeking expert advice 
on developing eight acres of the property. (Tr. 11:3 061-62) While 
in that process, he recalled that previously one of his employees, 
Jeri Stevens, had told him "there might be some wood out there, 
meaning the outdoor pavilion." (Tr. II: 3062) Alldredge decided 
to investigate whether there was wood in the pods. 
It is difficult to remove the tightly fitted marble facia from 
the crypts—the job requires a hired crew to use two sets of large 
suction cups and scaffolding (to reach the upper crypts). (Tr. 
11:3061, 64) Alldredge decided to hire a crew to remove the marble 
facia in May 1990. (Tr. 11:3065) When the facia had been taken 
off several of the crypts, he was shocked and infuriated to 
discover the crypts were made of plywood two-by-twos and two-by-
fours—many of them warped. (Tr. 11:3065-66) Of the 510 crypts 
contained in the five pods, Alldredge discovered that those in pods 
2, 3 and 4 were constructed entirely of wood and those in pods 1 
and 5 were a mixture of wood and concrete. (Tr. 11:3066, 79-83) 
Only the crypts in the first three levels of pod 1 were completely 
concrete—and they were cracked. (Tr. 11:3067) 
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The great bulk of wood crypts had no ventilation or drainage, 
and those that did merely had holes bored in the wood which allowed 
gas from one crypt to escape to another and body fluids to drip 
onto the caskets below,2 (Tr. 11:3067) There was no recess to 
allow a tight plexiglass seal pursuant to Fluckiger's plans and 
industry standards. Id.; see Exh. 9-11. 
After the discovery Ong International did nothing with the 
Mausoleum, because, upon consulting with Mausoleum experts, it 
discovered it could not sell wood crypts. (Tr. 11:3096) Of the 
outdoor crypts, 185 had been sold and 15 contained entombed 
remains. (Tr. VI:3975) 
In August 1990, after removing enough facia to discover the 
extent of the wood crypts, Alldredge notified the mausoleum 
insurance agents, Alfred Landvatter and Steven Nielson, that rather 
than being entirely concrete as previously represented, most of the 
crypts were made of wood. (Tr. 11:3077) 
16. The Wood Crypts Were Valueless and a Liability. 
Ong International's mausoleum expert, James C. Milne, is an 
internationally qualified structural engineer who specializes in 
the design and construction of community mausoleum buildings. (Tr. 
IV:3558) He has constructed hundreds worldwide and owned many 
mausolea. (Tr. IV:3567) 
Milne testified: 
20ng International's expert, Clarence G. Newlon, is a mortician who 
testified that embalming fluid remains in the body until entombment, after which 
it solidifies and turns to gas. (Tr. VI:3905) Formaldehyde, a commonly used 
embalming fluid, does not evaporate and remains in the entombed body. (Tr. 
VI:3907) Escaping body fluids can corrode even metal caskets. (Tr. VI:3909) 
Furthermore caskets that are not properly sealed emit an offensive odor. (Tr. 
VI:3908-09) 
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(a) That he was "appalled" to discover the crypts were 
created of "chipboard and plywood and lumber." 
(Tr. IV:3599) He had never seen any in the United 
States or Canada. Id. The crypts had no proper 
ventilation or drainage systems whatsoever. Id. 
(b) That the standards for mausoleum construction, 
which vary little from state to state (Tr. IV:3584-
85) , require that crypts have, inter alia, drain-
age, ventilation and an air-tight seal. (Tr. 
IV:3575-76) Drainage systems are necessary to 
allow corrosive body fluids to drain from the 
crypt. (Tr. IV:3596) 
(c) That the wood crypts lacked recesses for "proper 
sealing" against insects and odors. Id. There was 
no proper way to mount the marble facings. Id. 
The crypts themselves were too short and narrow to 
meet industry standards. (Tr. IV:3602) The infe-
rior woods used violate the Uniform Building Code, 
because they are too weak to support reinforced 
concrete. (Tr. IV: 3619) In two or three of the 
crypts, the wood was already starting to bow. (Tr. 
IV:3626) 
(d) That in addition to the "practical aspect" of being 
a place for entombment, a mausoleum must be de-
signed to give comfort to people who are "sensitive 
and emotionally disturbed at the time of death." 
(Tr. IV: 3574) The wood crypts are unsalable, among 
other reasons, because they are not perceived as 
appropriate entombment. Id. 
(e) That he compared the discovery of wood crypts to 
"buying a beautiful new house with plastered walls 
and then learning that the structural studding had 
been built out of cardboard." (Tr. IV:3601) 
(f) That using Salt Lake standards, Milne estimated 
$522,698.00 as the cost to bring SLMM up to stan-
dards by replacing the wood crypts with concrete 
crypts. (Tr. IV:3605) Milne estimated $676,238.00 
($573,238.00 reconstruction plus $103,000.00 demo-
lition) as the cost to rebuild the outdoor pavilion 
from the ground up. (Tr. IV:3609-10) 
Ong International's expert, Cramer J. Stiff, was a consultant 
sales contractor for cemeteries, mausolea and funeral homes. (Tr. 
VI:3950) He had extensive field work in Utah, Kansas, Florida and 
California. (Tr. VI:3953) Stiff has been responsible for 
developing sales programs for mausolea. (Tr. VI:3954-55) 
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In all his travels and experience, Stiff had never heard of 
the existence of a wooden crypt in the United States. (Tr. 
VI:3973) 
Stiff testified that the important factor in crypt sales is 
"peace of mind." (Tr. VI-.3961-62, 65) Had the outdoor crypts been 
built of concrete as represented, they would have been highly 
salable (Tr. VI:3965),3 but in their current condition they 
"absolutely" could not be sold, because there could be no promise 
of "perpetuity" or "peace of mind." (Tr. VI:3971) Sales of the 
indoor crypts would also drop, because the current "stigma" or 
"stain" on the outdoor pavilion would cast doubt on the truth of 
the representations about the indoor Mausoleum. (Tr. VI:3972) 
Stifffs recommendation for the Mausoleum's future was to tear 
the outdoor pavilion down and start over. (Tr. VI:3974) To 
facilitate reconstruction, the Mausoleum would be required to 
obtain consent agreements from each of the 185 crypt purchasers, as 
well as with the families of the 15 whose remains are already 
entombed in the crypts, which remains would have to be transported 
by hearse for temporary storage and re-interment in another 
mausoleum. (Tr. VI:3975-78) Special problems would arise should 
the bottoms have rotted from wooden caskets or the handles have 
fallen off. (Tr. VI: 3975-77) Of course the same problems arise on 
the return trip, particularly after further deterioration has 
occurred. (Tr. VI:3978) That entire process is complicated and 
costly. (Tr. VI:4007-10) 
3Stiff estimated sales of properly constructed concrete crypts at 200 for 
the first year (Tr. VI:3970), which was the figure Garner gave Ong International 
as an incentive to enter into the partnership (Tr. V:3832). 
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William Lang, MAI, an independent fee appraiser called by Ong 
International testified that the Mausoleum had a negative net worth 
of $819,036.00. (Tr. VI:4063) Mr. Lang is a certified general 
appraiser with a particular interest in unique or special proper-
ties. (Tr. VI:4038) He employed approaches to value ordinarily 
and customarily employed by appraisers with emphasis on the income 
approach. (Tr. VI:4049) The appellants offered no evidence to 
rebut Mr. Lang's conclusions. 
Ong International's experts all said the property was 
unsalable, and Ong considered it "tainted with scandal." (Tr. 
V:3831) 
17. The Garner Appellants' Crypt Salespersons fell Prey to the 
Fraud—but the True Victims were the Unsuspecting Customers. 
In 1981-82 Sandra Lenois worked for a firm that marketed 
products at the Mausoleum (Tr. VI:3916), then from 1983-85 for the 
Mausoleum itself (Tr. VI:3919). Lenois started by putting together 
sales mail-outs inviting the public to take tours of the Mausoleum, 
and later became the sales manager. (Tr. VI:3919-20) 
The first stop on the standard tour was at the indoor model 
crypt, where the sales representative would flip on the light and 
show how body gasses and fluids escaped through the ventilation 
piping. (Tr. VI:3922) The tour continued past the purported 
luminary crypts of the Hanks, the Osmonds, the Utah Jazz and other 
names Lenois could not remember. (Tr. VI:3923) 
A large number of the outdoor crypts were sold before the 
pavilion was actually constructed. (Tr. VI:3923) The customers 
were taken to the plot where the pavilion was "staked out." (Tr. 
VI:3931) They were shown artists drawings and told the outdoor 
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crypts would be just like the indoor, except the customers could 
choose from three different types of marble facia. (Tr. VI:3924) 
In late 1984 or early 1985, Lenois became concerned about the 
construction of the outdoor pavilion, because it was behind 
schedule, customers were complaining and she was not getting the 
answers she needed. (Tr. VI:3926) Garner told her to talk to Ord 
(Tr. VI: 3928), who said the delays resulted from "the fact that 
the crypts were being precast and prestressed in some other state." 
(Tr. VI:3929) Lenois did not believe him. (Tr. VI:3930) In fact 
no precast concrete crypt, in or out of state, was ever a part of 
the outdoor mausoleum. (Tr. V:3770) When she related her concerns 
to Garner, he said not to worry because he owned Ord Construction. 
(Tr. VI:3931) 
In 1984 James O. Cumminas and his wife Joyce were interested 
in buying a crypt, because the 1983 floods had destroyed some 
graves in Bountiful and other places. (Tr. VI:4019) A Mausoleum 
sales representative took the Cummings on a tour of the indoor 
mausoleum which included a turn past the alleged Hanks and Osmond 
crypts. (Tr: VI:4021) 
Cummings and his wife had purchased crypts in what they were 
told would be a second story to the existing mausoleum, and they 
were very angry when they later found they had been transferred to 
the outdoor pavilion. (Tr. IV:3935) Their concrete crypts were to 
be in pod 3 of the yet to be constructed outdoor pavilion. 
Cummings did not know pod 3 was to be constructed of wood. (Tr. 
VI:4022) 
The Cummings were told the outdoor pavilion would be compara-
ble to the existing mausoleum "as far as quality, durability, that 
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type of thing." (Tr. VI:4023) In response to Cummings1 com-
plaints, Lenois sent him a letter from the Garner appellants, dated 
May 3, 1985, using information Ord gave her to explain the delay in 
construction: "The interlocking crypts are being precast and 
prestressed at this time before installation." (Tr. VI:3935, 4025; 
see Exh. 70) 
Cummings interpreted the letter to mean the crypts were being 
constructed definitely of concrete and possibly of steel. (Tr. 
VI:4025) The first word Cummings heard about wood crypts came from 
Alldredge about one year before trial (which would be August 1990). 
(Tr. VI-.4025) 
Lenois was also concerned about the sales presentation she was 
making to potential customers. (Tr. VI:3935) Garner personally 
reviewed the written sales pitch and took the standard tour with 
Lenois. His only comment was not to be too morbid when talking 
about the model crypt. (Tr. VI: 3937-37A) Garner did not tell her 
to include information about the differences between the indoor and 
outdoor crypts. (Tr. VI:3937A) 
Cummings and his wife would have never purchased the wood 
crypts had they been aware of their construction. (Tr. VI:4026) 
18. The Garner Appellants Defrauded their Insurance Company. 
In late 1986, Steven R. Nielson, a commercial insurance agent, 
met Garner through an insurance broker, Alfred Landvatter (Tr. 
V:3761), and had several meetings with him, lasting from 45 minutes 
to 1-1/2 hours (Tr. 3762A-64). Garner said Nielson would have a 
chance to bid on the Mausoleum project. (Tr. V:3763) During 
Nielson's second meeting with Garner, they toured the indoor 
Mausoleum, Garner commenting that it was "solid concrete" and 
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"built like a bunker," (Tr. V:3765) Nielson was impressed by the 
construction of the old indoor mausoleum and could tell it was 
built of poured in place concrete. (Tr: V:3766) Nielson also 
received the crypts-of-the-stars speech from Garner. (Tr. V:3769) 
Garner then walked Nielson to the outdoor pavilion, where 
Nielson could see that the crypts had not been completed. (Tr. 
V:3770) The bottom two rows of pod 1 were constructed of concrete 
poured in place by use of wooden framing. (Tr. V:3370) Nielson 
had a "lengthy" conversation with Garner regarding the outdoor 
crypt construction, in which he stressed that all wood must be 
removed after the concrete was poured, since he was in the process 
of preparing his insurance bid for the mausoleum policy. (Tr. 
V:3770A, 3771) Garner responded, "Yes, there will be no problem. 
This building will meet or exceed the standards of the old 
building." (Tr. V:3771) In reliance on Garner's statements 
concerning the construction of the outdoor crypts, Nielson 
completed the risk analysis, then bid and issued an insurance 
policy on the outdoor crypts as all concrete constructions. (Tr. 
V:3771-73) 
In June 1987, Nielson returned to the mausoleum (after two or 
three meetings with Garner in the interim) to inspect the crypts. 
(Tr. V:37773-5) Nielson was perplexed when he saw that marble 
facia covered the crypts in all five pods, because he could not 
understand how Garner could have completed the poured in place 
concrete crypts that quickly. (Tr. V:3775) Nielson first talked 
to Ord who said everything "had been all taken care of." (Tr. 
V:3776-78) 
In Ord's presence, Nielson asked Garner whether the work had 
been completed and the concrete had been cured. (Tr. V:3778-79) 
Garner said everything was fine and the work had been completed. 
(Tr. 3779) When Nielson expressed concern about drainage, Garner 
showed him the model crypt's drainage system. (Tr. V:3780) On the 
strength of the inspection, Nielson renewed the Mausoleum insurance 
(on all-concrete crypts) with the same company, and later renewed 
it again. (Tr. V:3781) At the time of the later renewal, Nielson 
asked Garner pointblank whether the outdoor crypts contained any 
wood, and Garner answered, "'No.'" (Tr. V: 3785) Nielson learned 
that Garner had lied about the crypt construction only after 
Alldredge called him, in a state of alarm, to tell him of the wood 
discovery and to seek his insurance advice. (Tr. 11:3077; V:3786) 
At trial Garner flatly denied ever having met Nielson (Tr. 
V:3691-92). 
19• Ong International Files this Rescission Action. 
On July 25, 1990 Ong International filed its action seeking 
rescission, as fraudulently induced, of all contracts between it 
and the Garner appellants, as well as restitutionary and punitive 
damages for the injury it suffered as a result of the Garner 
appellants' active concealment of the substandard crypt construc-
tion. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial of this case evidenced a massive fraud of the Garner 
appellants on Ong International. 
The scheme of Garner's deceit in building wood crypts and 
portraying them as concrete crypts as shown in the inside model 
touched just about every fabric of the Salt Lake Mausoleum, from 
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the City building permit officials who issued permits for concrete 
crypts, to an insurance agent who insured the outdoor pavilion as 
all-concrete, to a sales manager who thought she was selling 
concrete crypts, to purchasers who thought they were buying outdoor 
concrete crypts at a mausoleum where Elder Hanks, the Osmonds, and 
other celebrities were to be interred, and ultimately to Ong 
International who invested as a partner with the Garner appellants 
in the Salt Lake Mausoleum partnership. Keith E. Garner displayed, 
abused and played-off to the Ong interests his religious connec-
tions, his stature in the LDS Church, his self-acclaimed integrity 
as a builder of millions of dollars in commercial and residential 
buildings in California and Utah. Alldredge, a respected banker of 
the Ong family, was sucked into the fraudulent scheme because of 
Garner's religious overtures and the Mausoleum's representation as 
a place of final and spiritual rest. 
The Ong family, through Ong International, made its first 
investments in the United States in Utah because of the grand 
scheme and fraud of Garner. They invested $800,000 initially in 
the partnership and then an additional $420,000, for a total of 
$1,200,000 of capital in the Mausoleum partnership. The core of 
the Mausoleum partnership was the buildings. Understanding 
Garner's express representations as to the permanency of the 
represented concrete crypts in the outdoor pavilion just like the 
concrete model and indoor crypts, Ong International relied upon 
those representations knowing not that behind the marble facia of 
the outdoor pavilion were hundreds of stacked wooden crates made of 
plywood and chipboard and having no ventilation or drainage. When 
the treachery of the wood crypts was discovered, Ong International 
was saddled with the cost of maintenance of the Mausoleum, the 
inability to sell crypts of any description in the outdoor pavilion 
because of the unmarketability of wood, the taint of the entire 
mausoleum, and a Mausoleum negative market value of <$819,000>. 
Out of better than 33,000,000 crypts in the United States, Ong 
International suddenly found itself in June 1990 with the only wood 
crypts in the country. 
A centerpiece of the trial surrounded the credibility of the 
testimony as to whether Ong International was advised of the wood 
crypts by Garner prior to or at the time of the Partnership and 
Redemption Agreements. Garner's testimony was that he had 
expressly advised Alldredge and Ong about the wood crypts. That 
was backed by the testimony of Garner's personal secretary, 
Stewart, and his close friend and physician, Dr. Evans. Ong 
International's testimony was in stark contradiction that they had 
never been told by Garner or others or otherwise had never seen any 
wood crypts and would not have invested had it been known. 
The jury squarely found under a clear and convincing test in 
favor of Ong International and against the Garner defendants. More 
than that, the jury found that the evidence was clear and convinc-
ing of a fraudulent swindle entitling Ong International to 
rescission and return of the purchase price of $1,240,000 and to 
consequential damages in the sum of $1,165,022. So extraordinary 
was the fraudulent misconduct of Garner, that the jury awarded 
$1,800,000 in exemplary damages. 
The jury was properly instructed and charged as to the 
applicable law on fraud liability, rescission, consequential 
damages, punitive damages, fiduciary duty, and burden of proof. No 
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error with regard to the same is assigned by the Garner appellants 
herein. Garner assumed an astonishing position at trial—that wood 
crypts were warm, cozy and durable. That Ong International was 
entitled to concrete crypts as represented, not the cheap wood 
crates, was not lost on the court and jury. Neither was Garner's 
blatant perjury as to his assets, unmasked on the witness stand, 
missed by the trier of fact. The elements of fraud were plainly 
demonstrated in the evidence as were the consequential damages. 
The punitive damages are well within the Crookston test of this 
Court. 
The second core defense of the Garner defendants at trial was 
that the general release executed by the parties as part of the 
Redemption Agreement and including language covering "known and 
unknown claims," was a full discharge of Garner from claims of 
fraud incident to both the Partnership and Redemption Agreements. 
The governing precedent of this Court firmly dictated the district 
court's ruling that fraud in the inducement of an agreement 
containing a general release was just as pervasive, diseased and 
insidious as any other agreement and that public policy would not 
permit a fraudulent schemer such as Garner to escape his false 
representations by inducing a party to sign a release. 
The appeal of the Garner appellants herein must be denied. 
They have failed fundamentally to marshall the evidence as required 
by the controlling decisions of this Court. They have failed 
outright to show any error in law as to release, rulings on 
evidence, instructions, or damages. The Garner appellants' appeal 
was a miscarriage on arrival at this Court. 
Oft 
The judgment on the verdict of the jury of the district court 
should be affirmed in all respects. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT MUST REJECT THE GARNER APPELLANTS1 ATTACK ON 
THE FRAUD VERDICT, BECAUSE THEY UTTERLY FAILED TO MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE VERDICT AND INSTEAD PRESENTED 
ONLY SELECTED EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THEIR POSITION. 
The Garner appellants conspicuously failed to meet or even 
address the standard of review for challenging the district court's 
conclusions (R. 6:2533) based on the jury's unanimous findings (R. 
5:1872-77) that the evidence sufficiently proved Ong International 
was the victim of fraud (warranting punitive damages) perpetrated 
by its partners, the Garner appellants, through their material 
omissions and misrepresentations regarding the wood crypts. 
Findings underlying the judgment will not be disturbed "unless 
evidence on the issue 'so clearly preponderates in favor of the 
appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the outcome of 
the case."1 W. Fiberglass v. Kirton, McKonkie Etc., 789 P.2d 34, 
35 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton. 745 
P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987)). This Court must, therefore, consider 
the evidence "in the light most favorable to the verdict" and may 
not overturn any verdict that is supported by "substantial and 
competent" evidence. W. Fiberglass, 789 P.2d at 35. 
To successfully attack the verdict, an appellant must 
marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support it. 
Id. (emphasis added). "The appellant's burden of proof to 
establish that the evidence does not support the jury's verdict and 
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the f ac tua l f indings impl i c i t in t h a t ve rd i c t . . . i s qu i t e 
heavy." Id, (emphasis added). 
Garner ' s Statement of Facts presents v i r t u a l l y none of the 
evidence as t o appe l l an t s 1 fraud which both the jury and the 
d i s t r i c t cour t considered so egregious. I t i s a study in pos tur ing 
where Garner has a duty to be marshal l ing. 
Under t h i s Cour t ' s recent pronouncement in Crookston v. F i re 
I n s . Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991), f a i l u r e t o marshal 
evidence i s by i t s e l f grounds to r e j e c t the Garner a p p e l l a n t s ' 
a t t a ck on Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l ' s fraud v e r d i c t : 
Here, [ the appe l lan t ] has made no attempt t o marshal the 
evidence in support of the finding of fraud. In f ac t , 
a l l fthe appe l l an t ] has done i s argue se lec ted evidence 
favorable t o i t s pos i t i on . That does not begin t o meet 
the marshal l ing burden i t must ca r ry . We do not s i t t o 
r e t r y the f a c t s . This f a i l u r e alone i s grounds t o r e j e c t 
Tthe a p p e l l a n t ' s ] a t t ack on the fraud f inding. 
(Emphasis added.) Garner ' s statement of the evidence d e l e t e s 
p r a c t i c a l l y the e n t i r e f i r s t week of t r i a l of Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l ' s 
case in chief , as well as a l l adverse testimony Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
e l i c i t e d on cross and r e b u t t a l examinat ion—par t icu lar ly the 
overpowering evidence on the Garner wi tnesses ' lack of c r e d i b i l i -
t y . 4 The p a l t r y testimony the Garner appe l l an t s marshalled in 
4The Garner appe l l an t s ' w i tnes se s , s t ra ight out of centra l c a s t i n g , were so 
c l e a r l y biased and e i t h e r hapless or untruthful that i t may reasonably be 
inferred they l e f t ser ious c r e d i b i l i t y gaps, i f not chasms, between them and the 
jury. 
Arnold Fluckiger , an a r c h i t e c t , met Garner during the 1950s through the 
L.D.S. Church (Tr. 111:156-57) , has done projec t s for him s ince around 1967 (Tr. 
111:157) and regards him as a personal fr iend. (Tr. 111:162) . For h i s work on 
the never s t a r t e d second story addit ion t o the indoor mausoleum, Fluckiger took 
26 crypts valued at $3,000 each. 
Robert Ord, the contractor for the outdoor p a v i l i o n s and wood crypt s , was 
one of the o f f i c e r s of a Garner corporation, and does the majority of h i s work 
e x c l u s i v e l y for h i s best friend—Garner. (R. IV:3498-99, 3500) From 1975 on, 
Ord has of f i ced with Garner without paying rent or u t i l i t i e s — i n c l u d i n g te lephone 
charges . (R. IV:3503) Garner gave Ord two free crypts . (R. IV-.3543) 
t h e i r own favor came from Garner who, as the d i s t r i c t court 
concluded (R. 6:2534), perjured himself in open court (Tr. V:3733-
35) . 
The appe l l an t s 1 br ief suffers the same malady as the wood 
crypt scam i t s e l f : I t omits and misrepresents the substance of the 
evidence a t t r i a l . 
The f indings of fac t " impl ic i t " in the jury v e r d i c t , see W. 
F ibe rg l a s s , 789 P.2d a t 35, compel the conclusion t h a t the jury and 
the d i s t r i c t cour t simply did not bel ieve the appe l l an t s 1 w i tness -
e s . See, e . g . , Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 417 
(Utah 1989) (where conf l i c t ing evidence was introduced a t t r i a l , 
a p p e l l a t e cour t assumes jury believed those f ac t s t h a t support i t s 
v e r d i c t ) . 
Given the r i v e t i n g elements of fraud in t h i s case , the 
appe l l an t s have not met and cannot meet t h e i r "heavy burden" to 
chal lenge the j u r y ' s fraud ve rd i c t , including the pun i t ive damage 
award. See W. F iberg lass , 789 P.2d a t 35. 
Susan Stewart, Garner's personal secretary , f i r s t met Garner in 1975 while 
she worked on Temple Square where he was pres ident . (Tr. IX:4580) Her t i t u l a r 
p o s i t i o n i s "director of the corporation" (Tr. IX:4583), and her corporate 
d u t i e s include turning on l i g h t s , ra i s ing the f lag and the l i k e (Tr: IX:4581). 
Although Stewart had no a c t i v e ro le in negot ia t ing for the corporat ion, she 
t rave l ed with Garner t o Singapore and Hong Kong t o meet with the Ong family. 
(Tr. IX:4631-32, 40) Stewart asked Alldredge not t o t e l l Garner's wife Stewart 
would be with Garner on the t r i p . (Tr. IX:4695) Stewart saw Garner as a 
s p i r i t u a l l eader , and f e l t loya l to him. (Tr. IX:4632) 
Burt is Evans, M.D. has known Garner s ince the mid-1960s and belongs t o h i s 
Sunday study group. (Tr. IX:4650) In h i s depos i t ion published at t r i a l , Evans 
denied ever having had any business a f f i l i a t i o n with Garner (Tr. IX:4660). He 
was impeached on the witness stand when shown a partnership agreement he had 
signed (Tr. IX:4661-72; Exh. 108) and an assignment of h i s 25% Roundhouse 
partnership i n t e r e s t to Garner (Tr. IX:4668; Exh. 108A). 
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I I . CONTRARY TO LONGSTANDING UTAH CASE AUTHORITY, THE GARNER 
APPELLANTS CONTEND ON APPEAL THAT, BY HIDING BEHIND A 
GENERAL RELEASE, THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO ESCAPE LIABILITY 
FOR THE FRAUD CONCEALED FROM THEIR PARTNER# ONG INTERNA-
TIONAL. 
The Garner appe l l an t s argue they may not be held l i a b l e for 
the fraud they concealed from t h e i r pa r tne r , Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 
because Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l re leased every fraud claim, "known and 
unknown", r e l a t e d t o the wood c ryp t s . Ong's execution of the 
Redemption Agreement, containing the general r e l e a s e , they submit 
wipes the s l a t e c l ean . 5 The d i s t r i c t court r e j ec t ed t h a t argument 
a t every t u r n . 6 
In p o s t - t r i a l motions, the d i s t r i c t court viewed the r e l e a s e 
as p a r t of the fraudulent wood p l o t , s t a t i n g t h a t the r e l e a s e 
supported the f inding t h a t Garner had the r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e t o 
j u s t i f y an award of puni t ive damages: 
The f a c t s and circumstances surrounding the fraud show 
t h a t over a period of th ree to four yea r s , Garner 
misrepresented the nature of the plywood c ryp t s t o 
everyone necessary to advance h i s fraud, including 
customers, insurance agents , bui lding in spec to r s , h i s own 
s t a f f and h i s p a r t n e r s . He believed he could s e l l the 
mausoleum and escape the consequences of h i s fraud 
through the general r e l ea se of c la ims. 
(R. 6:2535)(emphasis added). 
5Paragraph 13.2 (Exh. 31 , pp. 910) reads in re levant part: 
SLMM, i t s agents , o f f i c e r s , and employees from any and 
a l l c la ims , demands, r i g h t s of act ion or a causes of 
a c t i o n , whether known or unknown, howsoever a r i s i n g , 
which in any way are based upon or re la t ed t o SLMM's 
a s s o c i a t i o n with the Partnership. 
^he r e l e a s e i s s u e was argued by Garner in the motions for (a) summary 
judgment (R. 2 :669) , (b) d irec ted verdic t and (c) for judgment n . o . v . (R. 6:2532-
38; 7 :2539-40) . 
The d i s t r i c t court a l s o refused the appe l lants ' o f fered jury i n s t r u c t i o n s 
nos . 5 . 1 , 5.3 and 5.6 (R. 3:974-76) , a l l of which s e t out the very argument 
ra i sed by appe l lants here: The re l ease must be enforced unless the fraud ran t o 
the procurement of the r e l e a s e provis ion i t s e l f , not t o the inducement t o enter 
the agreement containing the r e l e a s e . 
That Garner believed he could use the release to escape those 
consequences explains why he thought he could get away with this 
pervasive fraud in the first place. Garner was at the Mausoleum 
daily and controlled the business until the day he signed the 
Redemption Agreement containing the release (Tr. 11:3036-37). 
Garner then disappeared (Tr. 11:3043), dumping the crypt crates on 
his former partners. 
The threshold question for this Court is whether the district 
court erred, as a matter of law, by denying the Garner appellants1 
motion for judgment n.o.v. concerning the purported release. "In 
passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v. . . . a trial court has no 
latitude and must be correct." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 
817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991); see also, e.g., Sprouse v. Jager, 
806 P. 2d 219, 221-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (questions of law related 
to contract interpretation subject to correctness standard of 
review). 
A. Utah Governing Authority Holds That A Release in A 
Fraudulently Induced Contract Is Unenforceable 
In making the argument that the release clause with its known 
and unknown language operates, in law, to discharge Garner from 
fraud in the Redemption Agreement, Garner conveniently ignores 
established Utah authority that a fraudfeasor cannot escape 
liability for his fraudulent acts which are unknown to the other 
party. 
Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974), is a vendor 
fraud case in which the defendants included in the livestock 
purchase agreement release clauses that would exonerate them should 
the subject breeder bull die or fail to produce a certain amount of 
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semen. After signing the agreement, the Lamb plaintiffs discovered 
the defendants had misrepresented both the bull's breeder status 
and potency. 
Rejecting the argument that the plaintiffs released the fraud 
claims by signing the livestock agreement, the Court articulated 
the controlling public policy: 
[A] contract clause limiting liability will not be 
applied in a fraud action. The law does not permit a 
covenant of immunity which will protect a person against 
his own fraud on the around of public policy. A contract 
limitation on damages or remedies is valid only in the 
absence of allegations or proof of fraud. 
Id. at 608 (emphasis added). 
Lamb is directly on point because it voids a release contained 
in a fraudulently induced contract.7 "A release is a type of 
contract and may generally be enforced and rescinded on the same 
grounds as other contracts." Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 
657 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1982). 
Thus, there is no merit to the appellants1 contention that 
"known or unknown" language of the general release in the Redemp-
tion Agreement renders "immaterial whether Plaintiffs consciously 
held in their minds all of the acts or omissions they were 
releasing when they signed the Redemption Agreement." (Appt. Br. 
29) That statement compels the question in this case: "Unknown to 
whom?" Certainly unknown only to Ong International, but not 
unknown to the appellants. A fraud victim's lack of knowledge of 
7It is disingenuous of the appellants not to discuss Lamb, because Lamb was 
the basis of instruction No. 40 (R. 5: 1840) (the case being expressly argued to 
the district court)/ and was the primary rationale for the district court's 
denial of appellants' motion for judgment n.o.v. concerning release (R. 6:2189-
90; 6:2533; 7:2539-40). No appeal was taken by Garner from the court's 
instructions. 
1A 
the claim as a result of active concealment by the other party to 
the release does not bring the facts within the meaning of the 
"unknown" release clause. As even the appellants1 authorities 
hold, a general release exonerates only fraud claims known to both 
parties. See cases distinguished infra in notes 10-11. 
Fraud is particularly lethal to a release when, as the jury 
found here (R. 5:1874), the perpetrator has a fiduciary relation-
ship with the victim: 
Where a fiduciary relationship exists between the 
parties, the fiduciary owes a duty of full disclosure of 
the material facts when making a settlement and obtaining 
a release. The existence of the relationship creates a 
presumption of influence, which may be rebutted by proof 
that the parties dealt as strangers and that there was no 
unfairness in obtaining the settlement and release. 
66 Am. Jur. 2d Releases § 21 (1973) (emphasis added). 
The parties1 release is void because the jury found that 
appellants were fiduciaries to Ong International and that they 
fraudulently induced the contracts between the parties. 
B. The Testimony of Garner's Attorney, James Richards, 
Established that None of the Parties to the Redemp-
tion Agreement Discussed the Release of Fraud 
Claims Unknown to Ong International. 
Ong International's position regarding the release is not only 
settled as a matter of law, but was clearly and convincingly 
evidenced at trial as a matter of fact. Since the release itself 
does not allude to undisclosed fraud claims, the parties' intent 
becomes critical. It is blackletter law that any material 
ambiguity in the interpretation of a contract clause, including a 
release provision, turns on the intent of the contracting parties. 
See, e.g., Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Larsen 
Bros. Const. , Co. , 731 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986); Kolar v. Ray, 492 
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N.E.2d 899, 902 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (intent of the parties to 
release governs scope of release). Intent also examines the 
reasonableness of the release: 
Relevant to the determination of this question are all of 
the facts and circumstances surrounding execution of the 
release. Also relevant to the determination is whether 
a reasonable person in the position of the releasor under 
the circumstances then existing would have had such 
intent. 
Witt v. Watkins. 579 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Alaska 1978) (emphasis 
added). 
The jury in t h i s case was presented with ample evidence tha t 
no party to the Redemption Agreement discussed whether the release 
should extend to undisclosed fraud claims. 
James Richards, an attorney who had represented Garner since 
1987, prepared the Partnership Agreement and la te r the Redemption 
Agreement containing the release. (Tr. VIII:4465, 75, 80-81, 83) 
When asked of the par t ies intent at t r i a l , Richards t e s t i f i ed 
that the issue of fraud was never discussed by the par t ies or the i r 
counsel8—not during the drafting or signing of the Redemption 
Agreement containing the re lease . 9 
8For t h i s reason, Alldredge's fax to Garner regarding re lease of "unspeci-
fied l i a b i l i t i e s " (Appt. Br. 29) may by no means be construed as a re lease of 
fraud claims. 
9MR. CAMPBELL: As a draf ter of the document, were you general ly aware 
of t ha t law [referr ing to the policy statement in Lamb 1? 
MR. RICHARDS: That ' s a complex question and i t ' s one on which I 
would do specif ic research if I had a question concern-
ing t h a t . The question did not a r i s e , 
Q: Didn' t a r i s e , you say. Wasn't discussed, you mean? 
A: The issue of fraud was not brought up to get anybody 
released from fraudc 
Q: Indeed. So what you're t e l l i n g us i s in the course of 
negot ia t ions there was no discussion between you and Mr. 
Diang rcounsel for Qngl as to the guestion of re lease 
for fraud; i s tha t r ight? 
A: That ' s cor rec t . 
C. The Garner Appellants, As Joint Venturers and 
Later Partners, Owed a Continuing Duty of Full 
Disclosure of the Wooden Crypts. Qng Interna-
tional Had No Independent Duty to Investigate, 
The Garner appellants argue that they had no duty to disclose 
the wood crypts, because the misrepresentations at issue all 
occurred before the Partnership Agreement was entered* (Appt. Br. 
32) They also argue that Alldredge had a duty to investigate the 
crypt construction. (Appt. Br. 37) (citing Burke v. Farrell, 656 
P..2d 1015 (Utah 1982) ) 
Both those arguments fail for three reasons: (1) As joint 
venturers the parties shared a fiduciary relationship requiring 
utmost honesty and disclosure; (2) the appellants' duty to disclose 
continued after the Partnership Agreement was signed; and (3) 
Alldredge, as a fiduciary, was entitled to rely on the appellants' 
omissions and misrepresentations and he had no duty of independent 
investigation. 
The Garner appellants' reliance upon Burke is misplaced since 
those facts are wholly inapposite to the instant facts. In Burke, 
plaintiff's fraud claim against his partner was dismissed only 
because it was bottomed on the defendant's failure to disclose to 
the plaintiff the value of plaintiff's own partnership interest 
when the plaintiff was the managing partner. In the case at bar, 
Garner denied Ong International and Alldredge all access to the 
business records (Tr. 11:3035, 42) and deleted all computer 
evidence of the records (Tr. 11:3092). At the dates of the 
Partnership and Redemption Agreements, there was nothing to raise 
Ong International's suspicions about wood crypts. 
(Tr. VIII:4487-88) (emphasis added); see generally (Tr. VIII:4485-90). 
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In point of law, Burke supports Ong International's position 
that 
[p]artners obviously occupy a fiduciary rela-
tionship and must deal with each other in the 
utmost good faith. . . . This duty applies 
when one partner . . . seeks to purchase the 
interest of another partner." 
656 P.2d at 1017. 
For Garner to argue that at the time of the Redemption 
Agreement, Ong International had no reason to rely upon its 
partner, Garner, because of the lack of trust that had developed, 
flies in the face of this Court's decision in Berkley Bank for 
Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980): 
It can hardly be maintained that the 
general moral level of business and other 
financial relationships would be enhanced by a 
rule of law which would allow a person to 
defend against a willful, deliberate fraud by 
stating, 'You should not have trusted or 
believed me' or 'Had you not been so gullible 
you would not have been [so] deceived. ' The 
rules governing fraud should foster inter-
course based on trust, forthrightness, and 
honesty. 
D. Every "Release" Authority on which the Garner 
Appellants Rely is Immediately Distinguishable as 
Irrelevant to the Voidance of a Release Contained 
in a Fraudulently Induced Contract. 
Appellants would have this Court rule that the release must be 
given legal effect even though Ong International's signing of the 
Redemption Agreement (of which the release was merely one clause) 
was induced by Garner's fraud that was so outrageous as to warrant 
punitive damages. Appellants would therefore have the Court 
conduct its fraudulent inducement analysis in a vacuum by excising 
the release from the entire agreement and deciding whether the 
release itself was fraudulently induced, (Appt. Br. 32-37) 
-*Q 
That argument falls on its face, because, all provisions of a 
fraudulently induced contract are void, including any release 
provision contained therein, C£. Horgan, 657 P.2d at 753. 
Tellingly none of the appellants1 cases cited in support of 
their release stance concern releases contained in fraudulently 
induced contracts running between the parties. The appellants1 
cases focus on fraudulent inducement of the release, because the 
release was the only contract in existence between the parties. 
Appellants open with Winet v. Price, 4 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 6 
Cal. Rptr. 1159 (1992), a totally inapposite case in which, fifteen 
years after signing a release, the plaintiff tried to sue his 
former attorney for malpractice claims, when the plaintiff knew at 
the time of release that he was entitled to be compensated for the 
attorney's inferior work. Id. at 559 & n.5. No fraudulently 
induced contract was at issue. 
An even greater distinction is that Winet turned on the fact 
the release at issue expressly waived application of a California 
statute that states public policy supportive to Ona International: 
"A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor 
does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of 
executing the release. . . . " Id. at 556 (quoting California 
Civil Code § 1542). No such waiver was present here. 
Quealy v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667 (Utah 1986), is not even 
about release per se. let alone fraudulently induced contracts. 
That case simply holds that a contract provision for attorneys1 
fees is waived unless included in the new agreement reached by 
accord and satisfaction. 
Equally off-point i s Lucio v. Curran. 139 N-E.2d 133 (N,Y. Ct. 
App, 1956) , which involved a p l a i n t i f f ' s attempt to avoid a 
settlement release of known and pled claims that was del iberately 
negotiated during an action pending against a labor union. The 
court held the release was binding absent fraud or another viable 
defense. Id, a t 135. Lucio stands for nothing more than the rule 
tha t s e t t l o r ' s remorse i s insufficient to void a re lease . The 
Garner appellants c i t e a slew of other s e t t l o r ' s remorse cases, 
none of which have even remote relevance to fraudulent induce-
ment.10 
The Garner appellants ' remaining cases are a i r balls—they 
miss the fraudulent inducement mark every t ime. 1 1 None of these 
1 0 Paradis io v . Co lon ia l Townshouses, 526 N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (1988) , i s j u s t 
ano the r s e t t l o r ' s remorse case (from small c la ims cou r t y e t ) ho ld ing t h a t , in t h e 
absence of f raud , e t c . , t h e p l a i n t i f f r e l e a s e d known c la ims in a pending l a w s u i t . 
In Maxfield v . Denver & Rio Grande Western R a i l r o a d . Co . , 330 P.2d 1018, 
1019 (Utah 1958) , a s e t t l o r ' s remorse p l a i n t i f f r a i s e d de fenses of d u r e s s ( l o s i n g 
job) and mutual mis t ake ( p l a i n t i f f su f fe red no permanent i n j u r i e s ) . 
Horaan. 657 P. 2d a t 753, a l s o invo lves s e t t l o r ' s remorse where t h e 
p l a i n t i f f c la imed he s igned t h e r e l e a s e under du re s s and c o e r c i o n because he 
needed money and was emot iona l ly s t r e s s e d over l o s i n g h i s jobc 
No fraud of any s o r t was a l l e g e d in t h e s e c a s e s , and t h e r e l e a s e s ran t o 
known c la ims and were t h e s o l e c o n t r a c t s a t i s s u e . 
n K o l a r , 492 N.E.2d 899, i s a pe r sona l i n j u r y case t h a t has a b s o l u t e l y 
no th ing t o do wi th f r audu len t inducement. That case simply he ld t h a t r e l e a s e of 
t h e o r i g i n a l t o r t f e a s o r r e l e a s e d t h e phys i c i an whose t r e a t m e n t aggrava ted t h e 
i n j u r y . 
W i t t , 579 P.2d a t 1069, merely holds t h a t a p e r s o n a l i n j u r y p l a i n t i f f 
r e l e a s e d c la ims for an und i sc lo sed aspec t of t h e i n j u r y , s i n c e t h a t r e l e a s e was 
o b t a i n e d wi thou t fraud or t h e l i k e . 
The c o u r t in She l ton v . Exxon Corp . , 921 F.2d 595, 598-99 (5 th C i r . 1991) , 
he ld no th ing more than t h a t an a s s i g n e e ' s r e l e a s e of an a s s igned c la im bound t h e 
a s s i g n o r . 
N a t i o n a l Union F i r e I n s . Co. v . C i r c l e , I n c . , 915 F«2d 986 (5 th C i r . 1990), 
d i s c u s s e s t h e r e l e a s e of a known claim t h a t l a t e r proved more v a l u a b l e t han 
a n t i c i p a t e d due t o a premium i n c r e a s e t h a t was unknown and unknowable t o both t h e 
p l a i n t i f f and defendant a t t h e t ime of r e l e a s e . 
Regional Heal th S e r v i c e s , I n c . v . Hale County Hosp. Bd. , 565 So.2d 109, 114 
(Ala. 1990) , e x p r e s s l y d id not reach t h e f raudu len t inducement q u e s t i o n , because 
i t was v o l u n t a r i l y withdrawn from a p p e l l a t e review. 
cases involve release of fraud claims known to one party in a 
fiduciary relationship but not to the other. 
In fact the very case on which the appellants1 rely most 
heavily, Ingram Corp, v. J. Ray McDermott & Co,, Inc., 698 F.2d 
1295, 1314 (5th Cir. 1983), supports Ong International's position 
although, as in the majority of the appellants' other cited 
authorities, the case relates solely to settlement of a pending 
lawsuit. There was no fraudulently induced contract containing a 
release—the Ingram release was the sole contract at issue, 
Ingram concerns the plaintiff's release of claims against the 
defendants before the plaintiff discovered the defendants had 
engaged in antitrust activity with nonparties. The narrow legal 
issue was whether a party can release antitrust claims of which it 
has no knowledge. The district court said "no" after several 
lengthy hearings to determine the nature and scope of the fraud. 
Id, at 1302-05. The appellate court reversed on the narrow fact-
specific finding (and national antitrust policy) that antitrust 
claims can be released, because the fraud did not run to any 
contract the defendants had with the plaintiffs, id, at 1305, 
The Ingram court determined the defendants' "silence as to 
possible antitrust is not the same thing as fraudulent inducement," 
Id, at 1315. The court then made the unequivocal statement: 
Fraudulent inducement sufficient to nullify a contract is 
obviously a different matter. It can vitiate a release. 
This is hornbook law. 
The claims released in Pettinelli v. Danzig, 722 F.2d 706, 709-10 (11th 
Cir. 1984), were fully set out in the release, and there were no allegations that 
supported a prima facie case of fraudulent inducement. 
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Id, at 1314. The appellate court further noted that no fiduciary 
relationship existed between the Ingram parties, but that when a 
fiduciary relationship does exist (as the jury found here fR. 
5:1874)), the parties are reguired to reveal all potential claims 
that will be released. Id. at 1315. 
The instant release clause does not concern the release of 
known fraud claims pled in a pending action and does not involve 
settlor's remorse, or as the appellants1 put it, Alldredgefs 
"latent discontent" with the Mausoleum. (Appt. Br. 30) This case 
involves the appellants1 actively and fraudulently concealing from 
their partners the fact that the res of the contract was worthless. 
The Garner appellants simply cannot leave their partner stuck 
with the crates they stacked, by resting on a boilerplate release 
clause that in no way contemplates the release of undisclosed fraud 
claims—especially those of the present magnitude. 
E. The Jury Found for Onq International on all 
Factual Questions Relevant to Release of Fraud 
Claims 
The jury was properly instructed on the law governing release 
of undisclosed fraud claims arising in a fiduciary relationship.12 
The jury was also fully informed of the Garner appellants1 position 
on the release issue. (Inst. 12; R. 5:1809) 
Consequently, implicit in the fraud verdict are findings for 
Ong International regarding the following factual questions as to 
12Instruction no. 40 (R. 5:1840) stated: 
A release is a type of contract and may generally be rescinded for 
fraud as with other contracts. For public policy reasons, the law 
does not permit a contract to contain a covenant of immunity that 
would protect a party against his own fraud. A release in a 
contract is invalid where the contract itself containing the release 
was fraudulently induced. 
whether: (1) the Garner appel lan ts had a f iduciary duty t o d i sc lose 
the wood crypts to Ong In te rna t iona l before e i t h e r the Pa r tne r -
sh ip 1 3 or the Redemption Agreement was s igned, 1 4 (2) Ong 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l reasonably r e l i e d on the appe l l an t s 1 mate r ia l 
omissions and mispresentat ions regarding the crypt cons t ruc t i on , 1 5 
(3) the Garner appe l lan ts disclosed the wood c ryp ts before the 
Redemption Agreement was s igned, 1 6 and (4) Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
knowingly and i n t e n t i o n a l l y waived the r i g h t t o sue on the 
c l a ims . 1 7 
The jury expressly answered the f i r s t quest ion, by spec ia l 
i n t e r roga to ry I I I . l . , f inding there was a f iduciary r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the p a r t i e s (R. 5:1926), and the remaining fac tua l 
ques t ions were imp l i c i t in the fraud ve rd i c t , Western F ibe rg las s , 
789 P.2d a t 35. 
1 3Instruction nos. 34 and 35 (R. 5:1834-35) s t a t e that the p a r t i e s ' f iduciary 
r e l a t i o n s h i p was formed as soon as they became j o i n t venturers . 
1 4Instruction no. 21 (R. 5:1821) s t a t e s that the "higher" duty of d i s c l o s u r e 
between f i d u c i a r i e s creates the l ega l presumption that an omission or s i l e n c e i s 
a f a l s e misrepresentat ion. Instruct ion no. 41 (R. 5:1841) provides t h a t , as 
f i d u c i a r i e s , the Garner appel lants had a duty to d i s l c o s e f u l l y a l l p o t e n t i a l 
claims known t o them, and they bore the sh i f t ed burden t o prove they did not 
fraudulent ly induce the agreements. 
1 5Instruction no. 27 s t a t e s that in a f iduciary r e l a t i o n s h i p , a buyer does 
not have the duty t o i n v e s t i g a t e at the time of the omissions and misrepresenta-
t i o n s or afterwards. See a l so Instruct ion no. 26 (R. 5:1827) (no duty to 
d iscover l a t e n t bui ld ing de fec t s concealed by outer c o n s t r u c t i o n ) . 
1 6Instruction 12 (R. 5:1809) l i s t s a l l events that the Garner appel lants 
claim show the wooden crypts were d i sc losed to Ong Internat ional before the 
Redemption Agreement was s igned. 
^Instruct ion no. 42 (R. 5:1842) on "waiver" s t a t e s that in tent t o r e l e a s e 
the fraud claims may be found only should the jury determine Ong Internat ional 
knew about the fraud claims and i n t e n t i o n a l l y re l inquished the r ight t o sue on 
them. 
A ^ 
The pivotal question concerning release was, "Did Ong 
International know about the wood crypts before the Redemption 
Agreement was signed?" The appellants1 witnesses Garner, Stewart 
and Evans answered, "Yes." (Tr. VIII:4324; IX:4594, 4638, 55, 80) 
Had the jury believed even one of them, this case would have been 
over. But the jury did not believe them, and neither did the 
district court on post-judgment motions. Those credibility 
questions will not be reviewed by this Court absent clear error by 
the finder of fact. See, e.g., State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98, 102 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (jury's and district court's credibility 
findings deemed accurate unless evidence clearly shows they were 
erroneous). 
It is therefore abundantly clear the appellants have failed 
their heavy burden to establish that the evidence does not support 
these factual findings implicit in the fraud verdict. See W. 
Fiberglass, 789 P.2d at 35. 
P. The Appellants' Contention that the Fraudulent 
Misrepresentations Were Material is Erroneous, 
The Garner appellants argue they had no duty to disclose the 
wood construction because the fact was immaterial to Ong 
International's decision to enter either the Partnership or 
Redemption Agreement containing the release. (Appt. Br. 38-40) 
The uncontroverted evidence at trial established that the 
Mausoleum for which Ong International paid over $1,200,000.00 had 
a negative value of over $800,000.00. (Exh. 85) It could not be 
even auctioned off for a trivial sum, because of the huge potential 
liability to crypt purchasers, particularly the families of those 
already interred. (Tr. VI:3971-72, 74-76) 
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In the face of that uncompromising evidence of grand fraud, 
appellants announce to this Court that "[p]laintiffs1 evidence 
utterly fails to establish the legal or factual materiality of any 
misrepresentation of wooden crypts." (Appt. Br. 38) 
On the element of materiality, the jury was instructed as 
follows: 
As to the claim of fraud, the first element that 
must be proven is that the defendants1 representations 
were material. Representations or omissions are material 
if they were an important part of the transaction to the 
extent that the transaction would have been different or 
would not have occurred at all without such representa-
tion or omission. The representations must relate to 
presently existing facts or matters. . . . 
(Inst. 18; R. 5:1818) (emphasis added). 
Hence the m a t e r i a l i t y of the wood crypts i s t h a t Oner In t e rna -
t i o n a l would not have purchased the Mausoleum but for the 
a p p e l l a n t s ' fraudulent omissions and misrepresenta t ions regarding 
the cons t ruc t ion of concrete c ryp t s . (Tr. V:3829-30) Those 
fraudulent omissions and misrepresenta t ions about the wood crypts 
are the storm center of the Par tnership and Redemption Agree-
ments . 1 8 
18The Garner appe l lants ' "experts" knew nothing whatsoever about mausolea or 
crypts , l e t alone the use of wood in them. 
Robert Wilcoxen i s a funeral d irector and embalmer. (Tr. VIII:4397) His 
only experience with "wood" re la ted to mahogany and g l a s s "niches" or boxes 
designed t o house the urns holding cremated remains from which, no f l u i d s or 
gasses could be expected t o emit. (Tr. VIII:4401, 03) Wilcoxen had never sold 
or t r i e d t o s e l l a wooden crypt (Tr. VIII:4420) or been involved with a mausoleum 
that so ld them (R. VIII:4413) . He had never even seen anything other than 
concrete crypts u n t i l he was hired as the appe l lants ' expert . (Tr. VIII:4421-
22) 
Herbert Schroeder i s a professor of wood chemistry (Tr. VII:4238) who was 
prepared t o render d e t a i l s about the l i f e and times of t r e e s , but had never seen 
a wooden crypt u n t i l SLMM hired him, had only been in a mausoleum once before , 
and had never been consulted about use of wood in a mausoleum or crypt . (Tr. 
VII:4253) 
Lawrence Reavelv i s a s tructural engineer (Tr. VII:4262) who deals with 
concrete , but was t o t a l l y unfamiliar with the concrete used at SLMM. (Tr. VII: 
A * 
In fact the district court considered that Garner's assertion 
that wooden crypts are really okay a significant "mental state11 
factor in refusing on post-judgment motions to set aside or remit 
the punitive damages award against the Garner appellants: 
Garner has shown no contrition for his acts; on the 
contrary, he persists in arguing that he cannot under-
stand the dispute because wooden crypts ought to be good 
enough for anyone. 
(R. 6:2535) 
The Garner appe l l an t s 1 summary t reatment of Ong I n t e r n a t i o n -
a l ' s exper t testimony t h a t the Mausoleum i s unsa lab le 1 9 and has 
a negat ive net worth merely underscores t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to come to 
terms with the depth of t h e i r fraud. 
I t i s not c red ib le t h a t Garner would a c t u a l l y a s s e r t t h a t 
Cramer S t i f f ' s expert testimony for Ong should be d is regarded, 
because he "admitted" he has never sold a wooden c ryp t . (Appt. Br. 
38) Before t h i s case , S t i f f had never seen or heard of a wooden 
crypt (Tr. VI:3973), and ne i the r had James Milne a f t e r being 
involved with over 500 mausolea located throughout North America20 
4268A) Reavely ta lked about the durab i l i ty of the wood (Tr. VIII :4289) ; however, 
he admitted having seen "bowing and warping" in the v e r t i c a l wa l l s (Tr. 
VIII :4291) . Reavely had never designed a crypt or a mausoleum (Tr. 
VIII:4293) and knew nothing about mausoleum industry standards (Tr. VIII :4294) . 
l9The Garner appel lants s er ious ly miss ta te the record by t h e i r repeated 
a s s e r t i o n that Kovalenko was t o l d about the plywood construct ion of the crypts 
before he purchased them. (Appt. Br. 39, 71) In fact Kovalenko was impeached 
on the stand by use of h i s depos i t ion taken the previous month. (Tr. VIII:4390) 
After being confronted with h i s depos i t ion , Kovalenko was forced t o r e t r a c t h i s 
e a r l i e r test imony (Tr: VIII:43 87-88, 89, 93) and admit he had been pi tched the 
Osmonds (Tr* VIII :4391-92) , and had not been t o l d about the plywood construct ion 
(Tr. VIII :4394) . 
^The a p p e l l a n t ' s portrayal of Milne's damning testimony as r e l a t i n g so l ey 
t o the a e s t h e t i c d e s i r a b i l i t y of marble recesses and the quest ion "whether the 
v e n t i l a t i o n system might have been b e t t e r , " (Appt. Br. 38) i s unworthy of 
argument. 
(Tr, IV:3567). That is of course, what this case is about. 
Plywood crypts do not exist outside Garner's conduct at the Salt 
Lake Memorial Mausoleum• 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF GARNER'S 
WEALTH. 
Appellants contend that the district court erred by denying 
their motion for a new trial asserted on the ground that the court 
improperly admitted evidence of Garner's wealth.21 
Under Rule 59, "it is well settled that, as a general matter, 
the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for 
new trial." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 804 (emphasis added). The 
district court was legally correct in denying the Garner appel-
lants1 wealth-related motion in limine and their Rule 59(a) motion. 
(R. 6:2533; 7:2540). 
By Stipulation before Trial, the Garner Appellants Agreed 
that Utah Code Ann. S 78-18-1(2) (1992) does not Apply 
Retroactively to this Case. 
The rest of their summation of Milne's testimony is simply a fabricated 
indirect quote that "crypts should have a drainage system," although "one is 
needed for only one in every several hundred crypts." (Appt. Br. 38) That 
statement appears nowhere in the transcript of Milne's testimony (let alone at 
the referenced page (Tr. IV:3618)). 
21Appellants raise a new "wealth" argument on appeal that was not argued to 
the trial judge: whether it is ever proper for a jury to consider the defendant's 
wealth in arriving at a punitive damages figure. (Appt. Br. 41-44) They also 
point out (without claiming error in the instruction) that Instruction No. 51 (R. 
5:1852) states that the jury "must consider the relative wealth of the Garner 
defendants" when making the punitive damages award. (Appt. Br. 43) 
Both arguments are bankrupt in light of this Court's recent pronouncement 
in Crookston: 
The stated list of factors we have said must be 
considered in assessing the amount of punitive damages 
to be awarded include the following seven: (i) the 
relative wealth of the defendant . . . . 
817 P.2d at 808 (emphasis added) (citing Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 771 
(Utah 1985)). 
Al 
It is important to note at the outset that Judge Frederick 
held the admission of Garner's tax returns under advisement until 
he determined that Ong International had made out a prima facie 
case of liability and that punitive damages would be submitted to 
the jury. (Tr. VII:4235) 
Furthermore the appellants themselves put Garner's wealth at 
issue, because his "experience resumes," name-dropping, statements 
about having "a lot of money," showing off his conspicuously 
consuming lifestyle, all a calculated part of the inducement for 
Ong International to become his partner. (Tr. 1:2931-33, 58, 3025-
28; V:3654; IX:4584) From testimony of Garner's statements and 
activities alone, the jury was presented ample evidence of his 
pride and his wealth. (Tr. 1:2941-42, 2952-53; 11:2973, 80, 3036) 
Garner's contention that § 78-18-1(2) mandated bifurcation of 
the liability and punitive damages portions is clearly flawed. 
Before bringing their motion .in limine regarding Garner's wealth, 
the appellants specifically agreed that the statute would not apply 
retroactively to this case. The appellants' primary concern at 
that juncture was that the jury would inflate the verdict should it 
be instructed on subpart (3) of § 78-18-1, which requires that the 
State be paid a portion of punitive damages awards that exceed 
$20,000.22 
After first agreeing the statute did not apply, the Garner 
appellants' did a complete volte-face and argued it applied only 
^Section 78-18-1(3) reads: 
In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 
50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 
shall, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to 
the state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund. 
Aft 
for bifurcation purposes. The district court soundly rejected that 
notion by Minute Entry: 
Defendants' second Motion in Limine is denied for the 
reasons set forth in plaintiffs1 memorandum in opposi-
tion. Title 78-18-1 et seq. U.C.A., effective May 1, 
1989 is not applicable, the events involved in the 
instant proceeding having occurred prior to said effec-
tive date, and the statutory scheme having prospective 
application only. 
(R. 4:1398); Utah Laws, ch. 237 § 4 (1989). 
The express language regarding the e f fec t ive date i s restated 
in the notes to the statute and underscored in Crookston, 817 P.2d 
at 807: "[Section 78-18-1] does not apply to th i s case because i t 
i s made applicable only to claims for punitive damages aris ing on 
or after May 1, 1989. f | 23 
The correctness of that ruling i s also amply supported by the 
uncontroverted evidence that the appellants' fraudulent inducement 
of the Partnership and Redemption Agreements at issue occurred 
before Garner vacated the Mausoleum in March 1989.24 
Needless to say, the jury was not instructed on § 78-18-1 for 
any purpose, and the Garner appellants cannot raise the issue now. 
Moreover the appellants have not c i ted one Utah case in 
support of the ir contention that bifurcation was "mandated," but 
rely instead on foreign cases. Unfortunately for Garner, the wood 
crates were patched together in Salt Lake City, and no Utah court 
BThere i s nothing t o the Garner appel lants ' argument the s t a t u t e should be 
appl ied r e t r o a c t i v e l y because i t i s procedural rather than subs tant ive . (Appt. 
Br. 47) That quest ion need not be reached, s ince the l e g i s l a t i v e h i s tory 
contains express language that the s ta tu te i s t o be applied only p r o s p e c t i v e l y . 
^The Garner appe l lants ' spurious "discovery" argument (Appt. Br. 47) i s new 
on appeal; i t was never raised below in t h e i r motion in l imine , objec t ions at 
t r i a l or motion for a new t r i a l . At t r i a l the appel lants merely argued the 
substant ive /procedural quest ion. (R. 2:6851-52) 
A Q 
has ever held it is manifest error to try liability and punitive 
damages together. Indeed simultaneous submission to the jury of 
all damages evidence has long been the practice in Utah courts and 
bifurcation has been the exception. 
In all events the appellants waived any argument regarding § 
78-18-1. That waiver ran to all sections of the statute, not just 
those that did not meet the appellants1 needs. 
IV. THE PINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED, INCLUDING RESTITUTION, 
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES, REFLECTED THE 
PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR RESCISSION BASED ON FRAUD 
AND WAS FULLY SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE—THE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE WELL WITHIN THE CROOKSTON RATIOS. 
The Garner appellants1 broadside attack on the verdict is 
nothing more than a fusillade of omissions and misrepresentations 
related to the evidence at trial and the entry of final judgment. 
A. The Final Judgment Entered Contained No Damages for 
Conversion, Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Benefit of 
the Bargain, 
The Garner appellants1 arguments related to damages for 
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and benefit of the bargain25 
should be totally disregarded, because, contrary to the appellants' 
blatant misstatement (Appt. Br, 67) , judgment was entered only on 
the entire restitutionary award, including $1,240,220 (Ong 
International's capital investment of $800,000 plus its redemption 
^The Garner appellants assert that the benefit of the bargain evidence was 
immaterial. To the contrary, the jury was instructed that the difference in the 
mausoleum's property value "as was" and "as represented" was relevant to whether 
the Garner appellants' misrepresentations were "material and substantial0" 
(Instc 451 R„ 5s 1845) For the same reason, the trxal court did not err by 
allowing Ong International's damages expert, William R. Lang, to testify that the 
Mausoleum had a negative net worth. (Tr. VI:4063) There can be no serious 
question about that testimony's materiality to the fraudulent inducement claims. 
Furthermore the appellants waived any objection to Mr. Lang's testimony by 
failing to object below. Id. 
payment of $440,220), the consequential damages award of 
$1,165,022, and the punitive damage award of $1,800,000* 
The final judgment is fully supported by relevant authority 
concerning the measure of damages in a case of rescission based on 
fraud. Most importantly the final judgment is also supported by 
competent evidence at trial. 
B. By Failing to Make Timely Objection Below the 
Garner Appellants Have Waived all Right to 
Appeal the Consequential Damage Award, 
Ong International's election to rescind for fraud all 
agreements between the parties entitled it to compensatory damages 
for (1) full restitution of the amount invested and (2) consequen-
tial damages necessary to restore its status quo ante. 
The Garner appellants here contest-both Ong International's 
entitlement to and the amount awarded as consequential damages. 
The appellants, however, have waived the right to appeal the 
compensatory damages award by not objecting to: 
(1) introduction of the consequential damages evidence at 
trial (Tr. VII:4139-40); 
(2) the consequential damages section of the special verdict 
form, before the form was submitted to the jury; cf. Bennion v. 
LeGrand Johnson Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985), or 
(3) the answers to the relevant special interrogatories after 
the verdict was rendered, but before the jury was discharged (Tr. 
XI:4831-45), see, e.g.
 P Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 
605 P. 2d 1240, 1241 (Utah 1980) (defendants waived right to 
challenge verdict by not objecting before jury dismissed). 
Furthermore the appellants did not raise the consequential 
damages issue in their motion for new trial or remittitur (R. 
51 
5:1920-22), and did not appeal the r e l a t e d jury i n s t r u c t i o n s (R. 
5:1847-50)• The consequential damages argument i s j u s t another 
i s sue barred on appeal , because i t was never presented to the 
d i s t r i c t cou r t . 
In a l l events consequential damages are proper ly included in 
the measure of damages for r e sc i s s ion based on fraud. 
C. Ong International's Election of Rescission 
Against the Garner Appellants Ent i t les I t to 
Full Restitution Including Consequential 
Damages. 
"Rescission i s a r e s t i t u t i o n a r y remedy which a t tempts t o 
r e s t o r e the p a r t i e s to the s t a t u s quo to the extent poss ib le or as 
demanded by the e q u i t i e s in the case.11 Breuer-Harrison, Inc . v. 
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 731 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ( c i t i n g Dugan v. 
Jones , 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986)) see a l so Mawhinney v. Jensen, 
232 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1951). Because the goal of r e s c i s s i o n i s 
t o r e s t o r e the p a r t i e s t o t h e i r pre-agreement s t a t u s , the court may 
need t o award c e r t a i n consequential money damages t o make f u l l 
r e s t i t u t i o n . See D. Dobbs, Remedies §4.8, a t 293 n.12 (1973). 
As requi red or mandated by Utah law, Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
tendered the mausoleum back to the Garner appe l l an t s t o put them in 
s t a t u s quo an t e ; thus the damages inquiry a t t r i a l was l imi ted to 
determining the amount the Garner appe l lan t s would be requi red to 
pay t o r e t u r n Ong In t e rna t i ona l to i t s p re -Par tne r sh ip Agreement 
s t a t u s , t h a t i s , t o make i t whole.2 6 
^ h e Garner appel lants acknowledge that the purpose of r e s c i s s i o n i s t o 
r e s t o r e the p a r t i e s t o s t a t u s quo, but mischaracterize Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 
955 (Utah 1986) , as standing for the proposi t ion that consequentia l damages are 
not a v a i l a b l e in r e s c i s s i o n c a s e s . 
Consequential damages to a rescinding party were not at i s s u e or d i scussed 
in Dugan; however, that court did s t a t e that the t r i a l court has the d i s c r e t i o n 
t o do whatever i s necessary to return the p a r t i e s to s t a t u s quo. Id . at 957 
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"[M]ost l eg i t imate claims for damages" w i l l be allowed in 
r e s c i s s i o n and r e t r i b u t i o n cases . 2 7 D. Dobbs, supra § 9.4, a t 
633. Any proximately caused expense t h a t does not dup l i ca te the 
general recovery i s recognized. Id. § 9.2, a t 601; see genera l ly 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549 (1977). 
As s t a t e d in the r e l a t ed jury i n s t r u c t i o n , i t was not 
necessary t h a t Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l ' s claims for consequent ia l damages 
be proven with "absolute prec is ion or exactness" ; they needed only 
to " represent a reasonable est imate of the loss or injury suf-
fe red . " ( I n s t . 50; R. 5:1850) At t r i a l Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l offered 
evidence of th ree ca tegor ies of consequential damages in the 
following amounts: (1) $603,472.00 in cash advances t o operate the 
mausoleum28 (Tr. VII:4152); (2) $473,690.00 for i n t e r e s t Ong 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l paid on the advances (Tr. VII: 4154); and (3) 
(returning p a r t i e s t o s ta tus quo i s equitable and requires "prac t i ca l i ty" in 
adjust ing p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s ) . 
^Available consequential damages include but are not l imi ted t o : 
(1) l o s s of p r o f i t s , D. Dobbs, supra § 9 . 2 , at 598; 
(2) expenses r e s u l t i n g from fraud, i d . ; 
(3) " loss of good w i l l suffered with customers" and damage to 
reputat ion , i d . ; 
(4) any expenditure in mit igat ion of damages, i d . at 599; 
(5) l o s t earnings; i d . ; 
(6) prejudgment i n t e r e s t , i d . ; and 
(7) l o s s of i n t e r e s t on loans required t o finance the 
bus ines s , i d . 
^he Garner appellants again misstate the record by citing to Alldredge's 
salary as an operating expense, but failing to point out that Ong International's 
damages expert, Grant R. Caldwell, C.P.A., discounted the salary to $75,000.00, 
which Cramer Stiff testified was a reasonable salary for a manager of a 
mausoleum. (Tr. VII:4152) 
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$87,860.00 for a reasonable r a t e of r e tu rn on Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l ' s 
c a p i t a l investment of nearly $1,300,000 (Tr. VII :4161) . 2 9 
The Garner appe l lan t s offered no evidence a t t r i a l t o 
con t rover t those numbers, and on appeal they do nothing more than 
feign shock and ignorance t h a t consequential damages should even be 
a v a i l a b l e in a r e s c i s s i o n case . (Appt. Br. 59-60) There i s 
e s t ab l i shed Utah au thor i ty for awarding consequent ia l damages in 
r e s c i s s i o n cases . See, e . g . , Synergetics By and Through Lancer 
Indus . , Inc . v. Marathon Ranching Co., L td . . 701 P.2d 1106, 1109 
(Utah 1985) (in r e s c i s s i o n case, court awarded r e s t i t u t i o n plus 
consequent ia l and puni t ive damages). 
Any a t t a ck on the r e s t i t u t i o n and consequential damages award 
f a l l s under i t s own weight for lack of support and unt imel iness of 
ob jec t ion . Equally insupportable i s the Garner ' s a t t ack on the 
pun i t ive damage award. 
D. Punitive Damages are Appropriate in Rescission 
Cases Where the Predicate Act i s Fraud. 
I t i s well e s t ab l i shed in Utah t h a t pun i t ive damages may be 
awarded in r e s c i s s i o n cases based on fraud. See, e . g . , Nash v. 
Craigco, I n c . , 585 P.2d 775, 776 (Utah 1978); Clayton v. Crossroads 
Equipment Co. , 655 P. 2d 1125 (1982) (repossession of proper ty plus 
p u n i t i v e s ) . 
Synerge t ics , 701 P.2d a t 1109, a case f a c t - s i m i l a r t o t h i s 
one, affirmed the t r i a l c o u r t ' s award of r e s c i s s i o n of the two 
^Caldwell t e s t i f i e d tha t 10% was a reasonable r a t e of re turn expected for 
a t yp i ca l investor during the relevant period. (Tr. VII:4148) I t should be 
noted tha t Ong In te rna t iona l chose the reasonable r a t e of re turn measure of 
damages in l ieu of prejudgment i n t e r e s t . The amount awarded i s hardly 
speculat ive considering t h a t , for nearly three years , Ong In te rna t iona l was 
deprived the use of the bulk of i t s cap i ta l funds. (Tr. VII:4149) 
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contracts at issue plus $100,000 for the rental of a boat necessi-
tated by the subject fraud, $200,000 in punitive damages, plus 
costs. The Synergetics predicate acts for the remedy of rescission 
were, as here, the defendants1 fraud, misrepresentations and 
deceit. Id. at 1108. 
Hence it was proper for the jury to find that rescission, 
restitutionary damages (purchase price plus consequential), and 
punitive damages should be awarded Ong International. 
E. The District Court Correctly Concluded that, as 
Required under Crookston, the Punitive Damages 
Award Bore a Reasonable Relationship to the Compen-
satory Damages Award. 
The Garner appellants1 argument that the punitive damages 
award is not reasonably related to the consequential damages is as 
flimsy as the wood crypts. It rests entirely on mischaracteri-
zation of the unanimous fraud verdict, and of the legal and factual 
support for the verdict. 
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 805, sets out the standard of appellate 
review for a district court decision to deny a motion for new trial 
"challenging the verdict as excessive under rule 59." 
In reviewing the judge's ultimate decision to grant or 
deny a new trial, we will reverse only if there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision. . . . [A] trial 
court's decision to deny a new trial will be upheld if 
there is a reasonable basis to support that decision. 
Id. at 805 (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted). 
"Any motion for new trial on the question of punitive damages 
requires that the trial court engage in a two-part inquiry: 
(i) whether punitives are appropriate at all, i.e., 
whether the evidence is sufficient to support a lawful 
jury finding of defendant's requisite mental state, and 
(ii) whether the amount of punitives is excessive or 
inadequate, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice." 
Id. at 807 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
The first prong is satisfied where there is "'"wilful and 
malicious111 conduct, . . . or . . . conduct which manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the 
rights of others.'11 Id. (quoting Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp.. 
Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted)). 
The second prong is the subject of Crookston's thorough 
discussion of the guidelines for punitive damages awards. 817 P. 2d 
at 807-13. The Crookston Court stated that it fixed "the primary 
responsibility of reviewing the amount of punitive damage awards on 
the court best equipped to perform such review—the trial court." 
Id. at 813. 
We make it plain that the appellate court's role is to 
review the trial court's new trial ruling rather than the 
jury's verdict directly. 
Id. 
If the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages falls 
within the range that [the Utah Supreme Court] has 
consistently upheld, then the trial court may assume that 
the award is not excessive. In denying a rule 59(a) 
motion for new trial, the trial court need not give any 
detailed explanation for its decision if the punitive 
damage award falls within the ratio. 
Id. at 811 (emphasis added). "A trial court's decision to deny a 
new trial will be upheld if there is a reasonable basis to support 
that decision." Id. at 805. The propriety of a punitive damages 
award should be determined on a "case-by-case basis." Id. at 813. 
1. The Garner appellants do not even attempt a 
serious assault on the district court's seven-
factor findings that the appellants had the 
requisite mental state to justify the punitive 
damages award. 
R £ 
Under each of the seven factors in punitive damages award, 
see, e.g., Crookston, 817 P. 2d at 808, the district court set out 
evidence that showed Garner acted with "knowing disregard of the 
rights" of his partners,30 
In an astounding display of denial and obfuscation, the Garner 
appellants assert there was no evidence of Garner's malice, because 
he "has had a long-standing preference for the natural warmth of 
wood as a construction material." (Appt. Br. 53; Tr. IX:4592) 
Indeed "he was proud of wood and extolled its benefits . . . ." 
(Tr. IX:4652, 4555) 
That testimony and the "innovator" piece came from Garner's 
life-long physician and study group companion (Tr. IX:4655, 80), 
whose credibility was seriously damaged by his irreconcilably 
inconsistent testimony regarding previous business relations with 
30The following is a capsule of the court's findings (R. 6:2534-37): 
(1) Relative wealth of the defendant: Garner is a multi-millionaire who 
perjured himself regarding his net worth. 
(2) Nature of the misconduct: The appellants' fraudulent representations 
about the wood crypts caused Ong International to pay $1,240,220 for worthless 
property. 
(3) Facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct: For three to four 
years Garner misrepresented the nature of the crypts to everyone necessary to his 
scheme, then believed he could escape all consequences through the general 
release of claims. Garner has shown no contrition for his acts, but rather, 
contends wooden crypts are good enough for anyone. 
(4) Effect on the lives of plaintiffs and others: Ong International 
suffered tremendous "uncompensated" loss of time, money and resources devoted to 
the case. Moreover the appellants committed "egregious" fraud on the public by 
defrauding crypt purchasers and trafficking in people's trust in their religious 
leaders. 
(5) Possibility of future recurrence: Although it is unclear what Garner 
will do with the plywood crypts, perhaps the punitive damages will deter him from 
influence peddling and using L.D.S. Church stories and personalities to pitch his 
sales. 
(6) Relationship of the parties: The Garner appellants committed fraud 
against partners with whom he shared a fiduciary relationship requiring the 
"highest level of openness, trust and confidence." 
(7) Amount of actual damages: The ratio of punitive damages to actual 
damages is 1:1-1/2, which is well within the Crookston standards for reasonabili-
ty of relationship. 
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Garner . 3 1 (Tr. IX:4655-73) Appellants simply cannot meet t h e i r 
heavy burden to overcome the impl ic i t f inding in the j u r y ' s 
unanimous fraud ve rd i c t t h a t i t simply did not be l ieve the study 
companion's s to ry about Garner 's purported d i sc losu re of the wood 
c r y p t s . 
Moreover, i f one were to accept somehow Garner ' s "pr ide-and-
joy" claim9 the unsolved mystery i s why he would con t inua l ly pass 
off the c ryp ts as concrete to a l l i n t e r e s t ed persons 3 2 : p a r t n e r s , 
government o f f i c i a l s , insurance agents , h i s own s a l e s personnel and 
unwary crypt customers. 
Garner ' s mens rea should be as c l ea r t o t h i s Court as i t was 
t o the d i s t r i c t court and jury* 
The so le quest ion remaining i s whether the r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
pun i t i ve damages t o compensatory damages i s reasonable under 
Crookston, 817 P.2d a t 810-11. 
2. The punitive damages award does not exceed the 
Crookston guidel ines , because the fraud damag-
es are nearly 1-1/2 times the punitive damages 
The appe l l an t s argue t h a t a new t r i a l i s warranted under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 59 (a ) (5 ) , because the $1.8 mi l l ion award for pun i t ive 
3lThe wi tness 1 l o s s of c r e d i b i l i t y i s important, because the jurors were 
given the stock i n s t r u c t i o n that i f they be l ieved any witness w i l f u l l y t e s t i f i e d 
f a l s e l y , they could "disregard a l l the evidence from that witness" un le s s i t was 
"corroborated by other cred ib le evidence." ( I n s t . 58; R. 5:1859) (emphasis 
added). 
32The Garner appel lants make the we ight le s s argument that lack of in ten t i s 
shown by the fac t the crypts were open t o view during t h e i r cons truc t ion . 
Certa inly plywood could be expected while the crypts were under cons truc t ion , and 
would not r a i s e quest ions in the minds of persons not knowledgeable about 
mausoleum cons truct ion . Indeed Garner's assurance to the insurance agent, Steve 
Nie l son , that the wood was framing for poured in place concrete ( l a t e r t o be 
removed) i s p r e c i s e l y the reasonable inference any unsophis t icated observer could 
draw from see ing plywood and two-by-fours in the crypts under cons truc t ion . 
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damages was excessive and therefore must have been made under the 
inf luence of passion or p re jud ice . 3 3 
The complete misperception underlying t h e i r argument i s t h a t 
the so le fraud damages awarded in t h i s ac t ion were those for 
$447,034 aga ins t Garner indiv idual ly under In te r roga tory IV.A.1 of 
the Special Verdic t . The appel lan ts therefore claim the pun i t ive 
damages exceed the fraud damages by a 4 - t o - l r a t i o . 3 4 
By making t h a t bogus argument, the Garner appe l l an t s ignore 
two f a c t s : one, t h a t compensible damages ac tua l ly awarded based on 
fraud were $1,165,022; and, two, t ha t Ong In t e rna t i ona l vo lun t a r i l y 
did not include in the Judgment and Decree of Rescission on Special 
Verdict of the Jury (R. 5:1923-36) the $447,034 the appe l lan t s 
a s s e r t were the sole fraud damages awarded. See f u l l d iscuss ion a t 
Point IV in sec t ion A. That amount was dele ted as dup l i ca t ive of 
the remaining fraud damages. 
An equal ly core misapprehension i s the Garner appe l l an t s 1 view 
t h a t the r e s t i t u t i o n a r y damages in t h i s case , comprised of the 
purchase p r i c e and consequential damages flowing from the fraud, 
are somehow not r e a l l y "fraud damages" and cannot the re fo re be the 
bas i s for c a l cu l a t i ng puni t ive damages. (Appt. Br. 53) 
What the appe l lan t s appear to be missing i s the memory t h a t 
33Crookston creates no presumption based on the dol la r figure of the punit ive 
damage award, but ra ther , examines the reasonabi l i ty of the r e l a t ionsh ip of 
puni t ive to actual damages. 817 P.2d at 811. 
^The appe l lan t s ' argument abandons logic , since they simultaneously asser t 
(1) the so-cal led "fraud damages" against Garner, individual ly , were improper 
(Appt. Br. 60-61); and (2) those same damages are the sole bas is for determining 
the reasonableness of the punit ive damages award (Appt. Br. 52). 
The reduct io ad absurdum of tha t inconsistency i s tha t Ong In terna t ional 
was awarded no fraud damages at a l l—par t i cu la r ly since the $447,034.00 against 
Garner, individual ly , was not part of the f inal judgment. 
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the predicate act for this rescission case is fraud—not some other 
theory. Consequently all damages required to restore Ong Interna-
tional to status quo ante are the very "compensatory fraud damages" 
to which punitive damages must be compared under Crookston. And 
that is precisely what the district court correctly held in its 
denial of a new trial or remittitur: 
[T]he amount of punitives award, $1,800,000.00, when 
compared to the actual damages resultant from defendant 
Garner's conduct, $1,165,022.00 consequential, and 
$1,240,220.00 for rescission (which is an award necessi-
tated by Garner's fraud), for a total of $2,405,242, the 
ratio range is approximately 1:1-1/2. 
(R. 6:2533-34) (emphasis added). The court concluded that ratio 
showed a "reasonable and rational relationship of punitives to 
actual damages," which fell within the Crookston "rationale." (R. 
6:2534). 
The district court also emphasized that punitive damages are 
appropriate for punishment as well deterrence. (R. 6:2536) (citing 
Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1112). 
Importantly Ong International's restitutionary fraud damages 
are "hard compensatory damages" of money lost rather than soft 
damages of pain and suffering or the like, the distinction between 
which is discussed in Crookston, 817 P.2d at 811-12. Moreover, 
Crookston holds that hard compensatory damages are properly 
considered under Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) to determine the 
sufficiency of the evidence to justify the punitives verdict. Id. 
Here Ong International lost the use of its capital investment 
and was required to pour operating capital money into an unmarket-
able mausoleum. There can be no question that these hard compensa-
tory fraud damages form the basis of comparison for punitive 
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damages purposes. Similarly there can be no question that the hard 
compensatory damages of approximately $2.4 million bear a reason-
able relationship to the $1.8 million punitive damages award. The 
amount is certainly not excessive and there is no indication the 
jury was influenced by passion or prejudice.35 See Utah R. Civ. 
P. 59(a)(5). 
V. NOTHING IN THE POTPOURRI ASSEMBLAGE OF APPELLANTS1 
MISCELLANEOUS CLAIMS ASSERTS ANYTHING CLOSE TO REVERSIBLE 
ERROR OR MANIFEST INJUSTICE 
The "passion and prejudice" section of appellants brief (pp. 
56-71) is a hodgepodge of misleading and meaningless arguments— 
many of which have been waived on appeal for failure to object 
below. 
None of the errors claimed here constitute plain error or 
manifest injustice sufficient to warrant the retrial of this 
complex case. 
A. Ong International Elected Only One Remedy: Rescission 
based on Fraud 
For several reasons it is complete error of the Garner 
appellants to assert that "the trial court never required [Ong 
International] to elect rescission or damages as their remedy." 
(Appt. Br. 60) 
35This Court should not be moved by Garner's complaint that the verdict 
nearly bankrupted him. (Appt. Br. 54-55) In fact it is surprising Garner would 
bring up bankruptcy. 
On October 17, 1991, at 8:00 a.m. the morning after filing for a second 
stay of execution of judgment (the first was denied), Garner filed a voluntary 
petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. (R. 6:2382-84) On Monday, October 21, 1991, 
Ong International filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative to strike, 
Garner's petition as a bad faith filing. (R. 6:2406-42) Garner's bankruptcy 
schedules (R. 6:2526) showed the petition was nothing more than a delay and 
diversion to avoid the consequences of his fraud judgment. 
After a full evidentiary hearing, the Bankruptcy Court granted Ong 
International's motion and dismissed Garner's bankruptcy petition for cause. (R. 
6:2476-78) 
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By its Notice of Election of Remedy of August 4, 1991 (R. 
3:1208-10), Ong International unequivocally elected the remedy of 
rescission against SLMM/llth Avenue Corporation and looked to 
Garner individually (as the fraudulent inducer) only for the amount 
of restitutionary damages the corporation could not pay. See Ong 
International's Trial Brief (R. 4:1336-40); see, e.g.. Meredith v. 
Ramsdell, 384 P.2d 941, 944-46 (Colo. 1963). 
"The doctrine of election of remedies applies only between the 
parties to a transaction so that one party may seek cancellation 
and then sue a third party for procuring the transaction through 
fraud." Strout Realty, Inc. v. Burahoff, 718 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 1986).36 
In addition, the court instructed the jury that "Ong Interna-
tional claims it is entitled to be paid only once for the relief it 
seeks. . . . " (Inst. 15; R. 5:1813) The instruction continues: 
Accordingly, you shall answer the Interrogatories on the 
Jury Verdict submitted and if you determine that damages 
are due on more than one theory or claim to an individual 
defendant, the Court, in formulating the judgment on your 
verdict, will ensure that Ong International will be 
entitled to recover its damages, but in total no more 
than the damages sustained, regardless of how many 
entities may be required to respond. 
(Emphasis added.) 
On the basis of that s t ipulat ion and instruct ion that a 
judgment against the corporation would be a judgment against Garner 
individually, Ong International withdrew a l l i t s a l t e r ego 
ins t ruc t ions . (R. 3:1133-34; 5:1806-07) 
^In the Garner appe l lants ' object ion t o Ong I n t e r n a t i o n a l ' s e l e c t i o n of 
remedies (R. 3:1288-99) , they acknowledge and even argue for the ru le in Strout 
Real ty , 718 S.W.2d at 471, that the fraudulent inducer i s i n d i v i d u a l l y l i a b l e for 
the port ion of r e s t i t u t i o n the corporation cannot pay (R. 3 :1297) . 
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True to instruction No. 15, the fraud award against Garner 
individually was not included in the final judgment, since the full 
restitutionary and punitive damages award against SLMM/llth Avenue 
was entered against Garner as well. 
The Garner appellants1 mischaracterization of the election 
question is therefore disingenuous. 
B. This Court May Ignore Altogether the Appellants1 A-to-S 
Claims Regarding the District Court's Comments and 
Evidentiary Rulings 
The appellants devote ten pages of their brief to sundry 
complaints they letter "A" through "S11 (Appt. Br. 61-71) , many of 
which concern the district court's unexcepted comments or the 
court's post-trial review of the evidence. The remaining conten-
tions relate to evidentiary rulings that are legally correct and by 
no stretch amount to reversible error. 
It is important to note at the outset that Jury Instruction 
No. 3 (R. 5:1795) properly instructs the jury not to draw any 
inferences from the trial judge's acts, statements or evidentiary 
rulings. The instruction states that the jury is the sole judge of 
all the fact questions and that the judge has "not intended to 
express, or to intimate, to be understood as giving any opinion on 
what the evidence proves or does not prove, or what is or is not 
fact in this case." Id. 
In light of the instruction and for reasons set out below, 
nothing in the "A-S" section warrants retrial of this case. 
1. Review of the district court's "comments" is 
waived for the appellants' failure to timely 
object. 
As tempting as it is to showcase the appellants' lack of 
intellectual candor by examining each "comment" complaint in full 
context,JV it would be a waste of time to do so, because all such 
claims of error are barred from appellate review, since the 
appellants failed to object to the comments when they were made at 
trial. 
The "contemporaneous objection rule" is simple: "An objection-
able remark directed to the jury must be excepted to or it may not 
be reviewed on appeal." State v. Kotz. 758 P.2d 463, 466 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
The Garner appellants cannot escape waiver under that rule by 
simultaneously conceding and contending that the district court's 
comments were insignificant, but "as a whole," they "wove a tight 
curtain between Defendants and the jurors." (Appt. Br. 61) 
In Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp. , 470 P.2d 135, 140 (Nev. 1970), 
the court repudiated the very argument offered here, "that in 
accumulation, the judge's comments and conduct amounted to 
prejudicial error even though [the appellant] made no specific 
objection at trial." The Ginnis appellant asserted that the trial 
court repeatedly disparaged the credibility of expert witnesses, 
expressed impatience, "volunteered remarks having nothing to do 
with rulings," rebuffed counsel for trial tactics, remarked to a 
juror (while in the elevator) that the case was boring, and 
generally created the impression he was prejudiced against the 
appellant. Id. While not approving of the judge's conduct, the 
appellate court declined to rule on the prejudicial effect of the 
comments, "because the error was not preserved" for appeal by 
timely objection. Id. at 141. 
37The "comments" c la ims a r e l e t t e r e d "D," "E," " I " and " P . " (Appt. Br. 6 3 -
65, 68-69) 
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While nothing raised by Garner comes close to the court's 
alleged conduct in Ginnis, not only did the Garner appellants fail 
to object to the judge fs comments when they were made at trial, but 
the appellants did not even deign to raise the "comments" in their 
motion for new trial or judgment n.o.v. Since Judge Frederick 
never heard a syllable of the present complaints, they should now 
be disregarded. 
Furthermore review of the transcript will show that, in 
context, the district court's comments were very infrequent, non-
prejudicial and judicially appropriate. Any curtain that dropped 
between the jury and the appellants was spun from their own yarn of 
deception. 
2. No improper demeanor or error at trial can be 
inferred from Judge Frederick's post-trial 
expression of his view of the fraud evidence 
warranting punitive damages 
Equally undeserving of individual treatment are the claims of 
error raised in "Q," "R" and "S." The appellants make a sort of 
"retroactive demeanor" argument by saying that the district court 
demonstrated it was "hostile" or "jaundiced" toward the appellants 
at trial, through the court's findings in the post-trial memorandum 
decision denying the appellants' new trial and or judgment n.o.v. 
motions.38 (Appt. Br. 69/ R. 6:2534) 
The absurdity of the argument is clear since a trial court is 
expressly called upon to state its view of the sufficiency of the 
evidence when ruling on such post-trial motions. See W. Fiber-
38The Garner appellants neglect to point out that in each "Q-R-S" instance 
the trial court was articulating its grounds for concluding that the appellants 
had the requisite state of mind to justify punitive damages and that the damages 
were reasonable. (R. 6:2533-34) 
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glass, 789 P.2d at 35. Tellingly appellants cite no support and, 
indeed, there is none for the proposition that a judge's post-trial 
review of the evidence is an indication of his demeanor or conduct 
at trial. This Court's review of the district court's actions is 
limited to that excepted by specific timely objections taken at 
trial. Cf. , Kotz, 758 P.2d at 465-66 (claim of error for purpose 
of reversing judgment too late if made for first time in motion for 
new trial or appellate brief). The remaining alphabetized claims 
of error are as frivolous as the "comments" and "demeanor" 
arguments. 
3. The district court was correct in its eviden-
tiary rulings and, in any event, none of them 
can possibly be reversible error. 
The Garner appellants end their attack on the jury's unanimous 
fraud verdict in a spasm of inconsequence, which collapses under a 
cursory reading of the transcript. The standard of review for 
admissibility of evidence is stated as follows: 
We will not reverse a trial court's determination on the 
admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of discretion 
affecting a party's substantial rights. A substantial 
right of a party is affected if, viewing the evidence as 
a whole, there is reasonable likelihood a different 
result would have been reached absent the error. 
Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
There is no doubt that, considering the crushing evidence of 
the appellants' fraud, the verdict would not have been different 
had the district court decided any of the following evidentiary 
rulings in appellants' favor.39 
39Discussion of the evidentiary rulings will follow the lettering in the 
appellants' brief at 61-69. 
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A. The district court correctly excluded evidence that 
Alldredge attempted in May 1991 to list the mausoleum for sale 
after Ong International filed its complaint. (Tr. 111:3299-3301) 
There is no merit to the appellants' contention that the evidence 
showed Ong International waived its demand for rescission, because 
it "exercised dominion" over the property. First, at that 
juncture, Ong International was merely attempting to mitigate 
damages40. (Tr. 111:3 300) Second, Ong International sued for 
both common law fraud and rescission predicated on fraud. (R. 1:2-
18) Ong International was not required to and did not elect its 
rescission remedy until August 4, 1991 (R. 3:1208-10), well after 
it became apparent the property was unsalable. 
Since the listings were wholly immaterial to Ong's entitlement 
to rescission based on fraud, that evidence was properly excluded 
as a waste of time and a confusion to the jury. Utah R. Evid. 403. 
B. The district court properly determined that Roger Evans, 
the Salt Lake Director of Building and Housing Services, was not 
the right person to opine whether the SLMM could be licensed in its 
current plywood condition. 
First, as the district court noted, it was a prospective 
witness, Richard Ith, who conducted all inspections of SLMM and 
revoked the business permit pending approval from the Utah Board of 
Health. (Tr. VI: 3491) Second, the permit was held up by the Board 
of Health, and Evans was not employed by that agency. (Tr. 
VIII:4442) 
^The appellants' churlishness on this point is emphasized by the fact that 
instruction No. 44 places the burden on the Garner appellants to prove that Ong 
International did not make reasonable efforts to mitigate. (R. 5:1844) The jury 
is expressly asked to consider whether the wood crypts were marketable. Id. 
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C. Ord was properly prohibited from testifying why he thought 
plywood was good enough for the crypts, because, as the district 
court properly ruled, loyalist Ord's legendary lack of experience 
with crypt construction (see discussion supra at pp. 8-9) deprived 
his testimony of any foundation for that opinion. (Tr. IV:3549) 
See, e.g., Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Nelson. 358 
P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1961) 
F. The district court properly sustained the objection to 
"bias and prejudice" questions asked of Nielson and Lenois, because 
the questions were far afield from the scope of direct examina-
tion.41 (Tr. V:3785-96; VI.-3946) At any rate, the district 
court's ruling is not fundamental to the case and would not warrant 
retrial. See Erickson, 802 P.2d at 1325. 
H. The appellants1 seriously understate the record in their 
contention the district court erred by allowing Garner's wife's tax 
returns to go to the jury. In a bench conference, the district 
court pointed out that Garner had several months' notice to 
separate his tax information from his wife's, but had not done so. 
(Tr. VII:4236) The court permitted a summary of the only tax 
information available to Ong, and told the appellants' counsel he 
could sort it out with Garner on direct. Id. The Garner appel-
lants brought that ruling on themselves. 
J. The district court properly granted Ong International's 
objection to allowing Mr. Schroeder to elaborate the "durability" 
41The Garner appellants mistakenly rely on State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 
(Utah 1985), a criminal case in which the defense counsel was not allowed to 
elicit from a key witness the fact that he turned state's evidence or to impeach 
him with previous damning testimony that went to the core of the case and was 
well within the scope of direct. Id. at 655. 
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of wood was proper, because he was totally ignorant of mausoleum or 
crypt construction. (Tr. VII:4253). 
K. Mr. Reavely's testimony about the "workmanlike manner11 in 
which the wood was piled was equally without foundation or 
materiality. He admitted to knowing nothing about mausoleum 
industry standards (Tr. VIII:4294) and had never constructed a 
crypt (Tr. VIII:4293). 
L. The testimony of Mr. Landvatter (Garner's Temple Square 
and study group companion of 15 years) that Garner used the terms 
"bunker" and "solid concrete" to refer to the old indoor mausoleum 
(Tr. VIII:4304-05) is a red herring, because Mr. Nielson's 
testimony on that point was exactly the same (Tr. V:3765). The 
appellants conveniently omit Nielson's later testimony that Garner 
told him the outdoor crypts would "'meet or exceed the standards of 
the old building. '" (Tr. V:3771) , and that there was no wood in the 
completed outdoor pavilion (Tr. Tr. V:3785). The appellants also 
omit the fact that Nielson twice renewed the mausoleum policy after 
Garner repeatedly reassured him all wood had been removed from the 
pavilion. (Tr. V:3781) 
N. The district court did not err by allowing Ong 
International's counsel to refer to Utah law when asking Richards, 
Garner's attorney, whether the parties contemplated release of 
unknown fraud claims—even after Richards said he had not re-
searched the issue. The district court correctly pointed out, the 
continued questioning was appropriate to determine whether Richards 
was aware of the issue even though he had not researched it. (Tr. 
VIII:4486) As discussed supra at p.36, Richards' testimony that 
release of fraud claims was never discussed is highly relevant to 
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the parties1 intent upon entering the Redemption Agreement 
containing the release. 
0. The district court properly allowed Ong International to 
prove Funk's bias by showing he had testified for Garner as an 
expert witness in four prior cases. 31A Am. Jur. 2d Expert and 
Opinion Evidence § 95, at 99 (1989) (footnotes deleted). There can 
be no question that, under Utah R. Evid. 403, the district court 
did not err by refusing to allow the appellants to trot out the 
facts of the four previous lawsuits. The result would have been 
wasted time, immateriality and jury confusion. 
In sum, the appellants' petulant A-S contentions raise nothing 
to undermine this Court's confidence in the jury's unanimous 
verdict that Garner perpetrated grand fraud against Ong Interna-
tional. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED COSTS. 
The Garner appellants contend the district court erred in 
awarding Ong International costs of $12,260.75 representing 
deposition costs of $11,503.00, witness fees of $631.75, and a 
filing fee of $125.00. 
It is undisputed that these fees are allowable. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 54(d); see, e.g., Lloyd's Unlimited. 753 P.2d at 512 (expenses 
of taking reasonably necessary depositions are taxable costs). 
"Depositions are generally allowed as necessary and reasonable 
'where the development of the case is of such a complex nature1" 
that discovery cannot be had by less expensive means. Id. at 512 
(emphasis added) (quoting Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pac. 
R.R. , 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). 
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Whether the claimant seeking cos ts has met i t s "necessary and 
reasonable" burden i s within the "sound d i s c r e t i on" of the d i s t r i c t 
cour t . Llovds Unlimited, 753 P. 2d a t 512. "The [ d i s t r i c t ] c o u r t f s 
ru l i ng on whether t o award a par ty cos ts of depos i t ions i s presumed 
co r r ec t and w i l l not be dis turbed unless i t i s so unreasonable as 
t o manifest a c l ea r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . " 4 2 Id . (emphasis added). 
In consider ing the Garner appe l lan t s 1 motion t o tax c o s t s , the 
d i s t r i c t cour t ca re fu l ly reviewed the claimed cos t s and reduced 
them from $27,737.85 to $12,260.75. (R. 5:2074; 7:6465-66) The 
award included those deposi t ions t h a t were necessary to the 
development and presen ta t ion of the case, considering the scope of 
the wide-scaled fraud. 
The Garner a p p e l l a n t s ' argument regarding excess fees t o 
witnesses i s miser ly , as the "excess" amounts t o l e s s than $25.00. 
Nothing ra i sed by Garner rebuts the presumption of cor rec tness 
as to the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s supplemental judgment for c o s t s . 
CONCLUSION 
This i s a case in which manifest j u s t i c e ca r r i ed the day 
without e r r o r . For the reasons discussed herein the judgment on 
the ve rd i c t should be upheld and affirmed in a l l r e spec t s and the 
Garner a p p e l l a n t s ' appeal denied. 
42The Garner appel lants incorrec t ly s t a t e that Lloyd's Unlimited, 753 P.2d 
at 1055, holds that c o s t s for depos i t ions not used at t r i a l are not recoverable . 
That case says nothing of the s o r t . In fact Lloyd's Unlimited approves c o s t s for 
the taking of depos i t ions i f they were taken in good f a i t h and, "in l i g h t of the 
circumstances, appeared to be e s s e n t i a l for the development and presentat ion of 
the case ." .Id. (emphasis added). 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
DATED this/***,^?^ day of June, 1992 
<c^ -
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
CLARK W. SESSIONS v_ 
of and for 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees 
Ong International (U.S>A,) D&D 
Management and David L. Alldredge 
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Attachment 1 
GRANT R. CALDWELL EXHIBIT 
GARNER'S SAVINGS BY WOODEN CRYPT CONSTRUCTION 
Cost to Construct Outdoor Concrete 
Crypts as of 1984 (Testimony 
of Arnold Fluckiger 
Exhibit P52) $ 582,500 
Actual Cost of Crypts To 
Garner and Salt Lake 
Memorial Mausoleum 
(Balance Sheet) $ 173,400 
Difference or Savings To Garner $ 409,100 
Attachment 2 
CHURCH ASSIGNMENTS 
Bishop of Menlo Park Ward, Menlo Park Stake 1952-63 
Seminary teacher 1953-60 
1969 
High Councilman, Menlo Park Stake 1949-52 
1963-65 
President of Southern Far East Mission 1965-68 
Mission Representative, Regional Representative 1969-75 
President of Temple Square 1975-79 
International Mission Counselor to 1978-82 
Elder Carlos Asay and Elder James Faust 
Elevated to Gospel Doctrine and Home Teacher 1983-
200727 
\M PLAINTIFF'S ! f EXHIBIT 
Keith E. Garner 
1001 Eleventh Avenue 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 
EXPERIENCE RESUME 
Principal - Keith E. Garner 
Mr. Keith E. Garner has been in the commercial, residential, and indust-
rial construction business as an owner/developer for over thirty (30) 
years in the San Francisco Bay area and in Salt Lake City, Utah. During 
this period of time, Mr. Garner has built and developed over eighty (80) 
million dollars worth of house sites, apartments, office buildings, motels, 
commercial buildings, condominiums, mini storage units, shopping centers 
industrial parks and resort complexes. All of the above were for his own 
account. 
Mr. Garner's financial references are: 
Sterling Harris 
First Interstate Bank 
Provo, Utah 
Zions First National Bank 
Richard Mouritsen 
Tooele, Utah 
Rhees Ririe, Senior Vice President 
Commercial Security Bank 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Wayne Hintze, Senior Vice President 
Zions First National Bank 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
200728 
Marian Andrus, Senior Vice President 
First Security Bank 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Glen Mowry, President 
Pacific Union Bank 
Menlo Park, Cali fornia 
Dee Tolles, Executive Vice Chairman 
Union Bank 
Palo Alto, California 
Mr, Garner's personal references are: 
Elder Marion D. Hanks 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
President Gordon B. Hinckley 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Senator Orin Hatch 
Washington D C 
Elder James E. Faust 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Elder Carlos Asay 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dr. Burtis Evans 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Experience as follows: 
1956 to December 31 , 1958 
Office Buildings in Palo Alto 2 
Apartment Units 
Coleman Avenue 119 
Hawthorne 5 
Channing 15 
Encinal Avenue 61 
Redwood City 17 
Alameda 4 
Total Construction for this period: $2,500,000 
January 1, 1959 to October 31, 1962 
Houses - San Mateo Drive 3 
Apartment Units 
Roble 17 
Alice Lane 2 
Woodland 8 
Middle Avenue 18 
Wilkie Way 32 
Manhattan 20 
Menlo Avenue 37 
Alameda 55 
Calderon 27 






Oak Grove 14 










Total Construction for this period: $6,500,000 
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October 31, 19G2 to October 11, 1965 
High Rise - Salt Lake City 
Motels 64 units 
















Total Construction for this period: $9,420,000 
October 31, 1965 to October 31, 1968 
Office Buildings 5 
Commercial Buildings 3 
House 1 
Apartment Units 
Willow Road 46 
Roble 14 
Arlington 48 
Total Construction for this period: $3,530,000 
SOO^l 
October 31, 1963 to October 31, 1970 





Zscuela Avenue 422 
Jana 145 
Total Cc struction for this period: $8,919,195 
October 31, 1970 to October 31, 1973 
Jffice Building - Hamilton Avenue 1 
\partment Units 
•IcClellan Road 94 
ligh-rise Condominium, Menlo Park 51 
Frame condominium, Menlo Park 6 
-rame condominium, St. George 63 





San Jose, Tully 
San Jose, O'Toole 
Total Coi struction for this period: $12,501,000 
"C07^2 
October 31, 1973 to December 1980 
Mini Storage Units 
Mountain View addition 
Redwood City 
Cupertino 
San Jose, Tully #2 
Mil pitas 
Salt Lake City 
Condominiums 
Olympus View, Salt Lake City 
Dorius Apartments, Salt Lake City (conversion) 
Office Buildings 
Mclntyre Building, Salt Lake City (conversion) 
Felt Building, Salt Lake City 
Aviation Club Building, Salt Lake City 
Shopping Centers 
Colonial Square, Bountiful 
Carriage Square, Salt Lake City 
Albertsons Center, Ogden 
Harrison Depot, Ogden 
Land Development 
Sub-division, 166 lots, Park City 
Park City Center 
Convention Center Building 
Recreation Building 
Restaurant Building 
Living units, 323 condominiums 
Idaho Project 
Convention Center Building 
13 hole golf course 
Living units, 114 condominiums 
Total of Construction for this period: $35,099,000 
Utah, California, Idaho projects 
£007^3 
January 1981 to June 1986 
Pinetop, Arizona Project 
Purchase of eight acres in the White Mountains 
of existing resort facilities zoned commercial, 
remodel and new construction 




Timeshare development with 2100 existing weeks, 
fully improved and approved for 7500 additional 
weeks 
Total for th is period: $4,000,000 
